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Contingent sourcing from a backup resource is an effective risk mitigation strategy under 
major disruptions. The production volumes and speeds of the backup resource are important 
protection design considerations, as they affect recovery. The objective of this dissertation is to 
show that cost-effective protection of existing supply networks from major disruptions result 
from planning appropriate volume and response speeds of a backup production facility prior to 
the disruptive event by considering operational aspects such as congestion that may occur at 
facilities. Contingency strategy are more responsive and disruption recovery periods can be 
shortened through such prior planning.  
The dissertation focuses on disruption risk arising from intelligent or pre-meditated 
attacks on supply facilities. An intelligent attacker has the capability to create worst case loss 
depending on the protection strategy of a given network. Since the attacker seeks the maximum 
loss and the designer tries to identify the protection scheme which minimizes this maximum loss, 
there exists an interdependence between attack and protection decisions. Ignoring this 
characteristic leads to suboptimal mitigation solutions under such disruptions. We therefore 
develop a mathematical model which utilizes a game theoretic framework of attack and defense 
involving nested optimization problems. The model is used to decide optimal selection of backup 
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production volume and the response speeds, the facilities to build such capability within the 
available budget.  
The reallocation of demands from a disrupted facility to an undisrupted facility in a 
contingency strategy leads to congestion of the undisrupted facility, which may result in longer 
lead times and reduced throughput during disruption periods, thereby limiting the effectiveness 
of a contingency strategy. In the second part of the dissertation, we therefore analyze congestion 
effects in responsive contingency planning. The congestion cost function is modeled and 
integrated into the mathematical model of responsive contingency planning developed in the first 
part of the dissertation.  
The main contribution of this dissertation is that a decision tool has been developed to 
plan protection of an existing supply networks considering backup sourcing through gradual 
capacity acquisition. The solution methodology involving recursive search tree has been 
implemented which allows exploring protection solutions under a given budget of protection and 
multiple combinations of response speeds and production capacities of a backup facility. The 
results and analysis demonstrate the value of planning for responsive contingency in supply 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview and Motivation  
 
Supply chain disruptions are random occurrences of major discontinuities in supply chain 
operations as a result of natural disasters or intentional and unintentional human actions. 
Disruptions due to operational contingencies such as machine breakdowns and 
transportation/delivery delays are more likely to occur but have less severe economic impacts. 
Disruptions due to natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, hurricanes, storms, etc.) or the ones due to 
intentional or unintentional human actions (e.g. terrorist attacks, strikes, fire, etc.), on the other 
hand, often lead to severe economic impacts to the supply chains, even though their occurrences 
are rare.   
 
Several instances of high impact supply chain disruptions in the recent years come to 
notice: The Taiwan earthquake in February 2016 affected global electronic supply chain with an 
estimated 25 billion dollars revenue impact. In October 2011, production at several computer 
manufacturers in Asia were halted by catastrophic flooding of hard disk supply facilities located 
at major cities of Thailand. The 2010 eruption of a volcano in Iceland disrupted millions of air 
travelers and affected time-sensitive air shipments (Chopra & Sodhi, 2014). A destructive 
earthquake hit Japan in 2011. Toyota Motor Company halted production at twelve of its 
assembly plants, resulting in a production loss of 140,000 vehicles.  In 2005, the U.S. Gulf Coast 
was hit by hurricane Katrina. Several warehouses and manufacturing plants were shut down in 
the aftermaths, and a severe disruption to the crude oil production occurred in the Gulf of 
Mexico amounting nearly 1.4 million barrels a day (The Economist, 2005). The air traffic 
suspension after September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, led to a disruption of material flow 
into Ford’s assembly plants causing intermittent shutdowns of its five US plants resulting in a 
13% decline in its fourth-quarter production (Vakharia and Yenipazarli, 2009). In 1998, due to 
the parts shortages following the labor strikes in two of its US manufacturing plants, General 
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Motors (GM) closed its 26 assembly plants resulting in a production deficit amounting to $809 
million in quarterly loss (Simison, 1998). 
 
As the above examples illustrate, disruptions result in serious financial consequences for 
supply chain firms. When high impact disruptions occur, these firms may face several periods of 
reduced production output, critical parts shortages, or inefficient goods distribution. When 
response and recovery mechanisms are not adequate, disruption periods are prolonged and the 
impacts cascade through one echelon of the supply chain to the others. For instance, it took six 
months for Evonik, an automotive resin manufacturer in Marl, Germany to restore its production 
operations after the devastating explosion in one of its manufacturing plant in March 2012. As a 
result of which, the downstream production facilities of Ford and other automakers were 





Figure 1.1: Cumulative and yearly peer-reviewed journal and review articles on supply 
chain disruption 























Full recovery from high impact disruptive events is often difficult with firms eventually 
losing their market competitiveness and customers apart from the immediate revenue losses 
during downtimes. Empirical studies have shown that significant drop in sales along with 
diminishing stock returns and shareholder wealth for many years may be expected following 
major disruptions (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). On the other hand, there are evidences where 
firms have gained competitive business advantage through better mitigation and management of 
disruption risks. For example, in 2001, shortages of semiconductor chips due to fire at Philips 
semiconductor plant in New Mexico (USA) resulted in Ericsson losing a significant market ($ 
400 million in lost sales) as compared to its competitor Nokia because of its inferior mitigation 
planning (Latour, 2001).  
 
Disruption risks have also grown in the recent years due to competitive business practices 
focusing on lower costs and leaner supply chains. The practices of just-in-time delivery, 
reduction of product life cycle, growth of global distribution channels and outsourcing make 
supply chains more complex and interdependent but leave little margin of error in operations. 
Risk management activities are however costly and firms need to investigate the trade-off of 
investments for capability improvements and risk reduction (Nooraie & Parast, 2016). These 
practical issues in managing risks, the unavoidability of disruptive events, and their impacts on 
supply chain operations, provide rationale for the study of supply chain disruption risk mitigation 
and management.  A growing interest in this area is evident from the search we conducted with 
keywords “supply chain” and “disruption” utilizing Scopus database. The search results indicate 
an increasing trend in the journal articles and review publications dealing on supply chain 
disruptions, especially in the last decade (Figure 1.1). Neglected in the past by many firms, 
systematic planning and management of disruption risks due to major events such as terror 
attacks or catastrophic natural disasters is nowadays recognized as an important part of their 
business plans (Simchi-Levi, Snyder and Watson.,  2002; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Sheffi, 2005). 
 
 Increased threat of terrorism worldwide and more sophisticated and well-devised 
techniques adopted by the adversaries suggest that new and effective mechanisms are required to 
ensure security and resilience of critical systems. The US Department of Homeland Security has 
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identified 17 sectors of critical infrastructure where investments in structural and operational 
resilience should be made for vulnerability mitigation against acts of terrorism, other man-made 
threats and natural disasters. As terrorism or natural catastrophes cannot be prevented altogether, 
the quest for more effective risk mitigation strategies continues to motivate research in this 
direction.    
 
1.2 Risk Mitigation Strategies  
 
Strategies for mitigation and management of major disruption risks can be broadly 
classified as:  a) proactive or preventive strategy and b) reactive or recovery strategy. The 
proactive or preventive risk mitigation strategies focus on appropriate plans and best course of 
actions which are adopted ahead of disruption occurrences so that the system is reliable, secured 
and suffers minimum loss during disruption periods. Such strategies are similar to increasing the 
mean time to failure (MTTF) of the machines or infrastructure systems. Preventive risk 
mitigation strategies follow practices of protecting supply flows through proactive redundancy 
measures such as acquiring redundant suppliers, inventory backup or protection (hardening) of 






Figure 1.2: Disruption cycle with preventive and recovery stages 
 
 
The reactive or recovery strategy is more concerned with the plans and course of actions 
following disruptions. The reactive strategy can be compared to reducing the mean time to repair 
(MTTR) of a failed machine or an infrastructure system. The recovery strategies ensure that the 
system transition from disrupted state to a stable state is fast, whereas preventive strategies 
ensure that it stays in the stable state for longer times, i.e., longer transition to disrupted states. 
This relation is depicted in Figure 1.2.  
 
A common way to evaluate risk mitigation strategies is based on the measures of system 
reliability, robustness, responsiveness and resilience. These terms have been described in 
literatures with varying degrees of similarity. In this dissertation, we adopt the following 
definitions: Reliability is the ability of a supply chain to operate effectively even when parts of 
this system is disrupted (Snyder, 2005). Robustness is the ability of a supply chain to perform 
effectively over all possible future disruption scenarios including some worst scenarios (Klibi, 
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Martel and Guitoni, 2010). Responsiveness is how quickly the supply chain can react/respond to 
disruptions (Klibi, et. al, 2010). Resilience is the ability of a supply chain to quickly recover 
from disruption (Klibi et. al, 2010). Resilience and responsiveness have often been used 
interchangeably because having a resilient supply chain equates to building its responsiveness 
capability, either through flexibility or redundancy measures. 
 
From these definitions, it can be stated that reliability and robustness relate to preventive 
or proactive mitigation, whereas resilience and responsiveness relate to reactive or recovery 
mitigation strategy. As post-disruption recourse actions are limited, supply chain resilience and 
responsiveness cannot however, be enhanced without pro-active planning and positioning of 
recovery and contingent mechanisms. Such mechanisms may include provisions of inventory, 
back up production, redundant supplier, hardening (structural protection) of facilities etc.  In 
other words, strategic and tactical level decisions such as where to hold inventory and its exact 
amount, where to have back up production and its volume or speed, which additional supplier to 
source from, which facilities to protect etc. should be implemented ahead of disruptions.  The 
contingency strategies are more effective and response to disaster events are faster through such 
provisions.  
 
This dissertation studies a responsive contingency planning problem in supply chain risk 
management, which involves pro-active protection plans and actions to enhance the effectiveness 
of a reactive or contingent operations enabling a reliable, robust, responsive and resilient supply 
flows capable of handling major disruptions.  
 
 
1.3 Scope and Objectives 
 
This research focuses on responsive contingency planning for mitigation and 
management of supply chain disruption risks. Achieving a faster and more effective post-
disruption recovery operation is a major objective of such contingency planning. For example, 
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holding strategic inventory ahead of disruptions and recovering disrupted flows through these 
inventories can be considered a responsive contingency approach of risk management as supply 
chains can react to disruptions faster through such provisions. Holding inventory for longer 
periods is however, cost prohibitive and is not appropriate for handling major disruptions that 
last for an extended period (Hopp, Iravani & Liu , 2012). Contingent capacity management 
through back up productions is a strategy that can be utilized under such disruptions. This 
strategy is more cost effective than strategic inventory since it does not lead to the accumulation 
of inventory because backup production can only be initiated after disaster occurrence. Capacity 
of a production facility can be contingently adjusted (ramped up) to partially recover the lost 
capacities due to disruptions or to partially/completely meet the re-routed demands from the 
failed facilities. This is especially facilitated in modern flexible or reconfigurable manufacturing 
system which can make quick capacity changeovers to adjust to the fluctuating demands (Putnik, 
Sluga, Elmaraghy, Teti, Koren, Tolio and Hon, 2013).  
 
A major challenge in contingent backup capacity management is in having the desired 
units of backup production available within a short response time so as to improve disruption 
recovery speeds. Response time is dependent on the manufacturing system structure of a backup 
production facility. A scalable facility is able to quickly ramp up capacities in small increments, 
whereas a facility relying on dedicated equipment to reduce production cost will have a slower 
response time (Nejad, Niroomand, & Kuzgunkaya, 2014). Response speed is related to response 
time and determines how fast a facility can reach its desired level of production.  Response speed 
and back up capacity volumes are critical decision factors in the selection and design of a backup 
production facility. Congestion is another factor that may affect capacity availability of a backup 
production facility during disruptions. The demands originally filled by a disrupted facility is 
shifted to a backup facility under a contingency strategy. This may create demand overload at the 
backup production facility despite its fast ramp-up characteristics. Consequently congestion of 
the backup facility result due to queuing which may affect the lead time and service levels of the 




In this research, we study the problem of responsive contingency planning in supply 
chains in which post disruption recovery operations can be enhanced through pro-active 
protection of selected facilities and provisions of gradual backup production capacities in these 
facilities. System disruption is realized as intentional attacks on network facilities from a terrorist 
or an intelligent adversary, and therefore the analysis relate to this type of disruption. The main 
objective is to develop a decision tool for strategic and tactical decisions involving system 
security and backup capacity management along with operational decisions of a recourse action 
for handling major disruptions from intentional facility attacks or worst case scenarios. The 
specific goals can be stated as follows:  
 
1. Determine which facilities in the existing supply network to secure and build the 
backup production capability 
 
2. Determine the appropriate level of responsiveness of a contingency strategy through 
the selection of appropriate response speeds and capacity volumes of a backup 
production facility  
 
3. Investigate the impacts of operational characteristic such as congestion on the 





This dissertation makes several research contributions: 
 
 First, it proposes a modeling construct which is a unified framework for disruption 
recovery and infrastructure security planning in order to achieve a more reliable, robust, 
responsive and resilient supply chain design. By doing this, it extends the scope of protection 
models by adding recovery component to the earlier models which are mostly featured on 
decisions of security or facility hardening.  
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Second, it extends the scope of implicit enumeration algorithm as a solution methodology 
by enabling search tree branching based on multiple levels of protection. In earlier applications 
of this technique, this has been limited to a single level. Consideration of multi levels of 
protection increases the size of the search tree, nevertheless, it enhances the applicability of this 
technique to solving more complex problems. 
 
Third, by considering the protection problem under budget constraint, it is demonstrated 
how the limited budget can be best utilized on security and backup production capability. As no 
distinction is made between the security (hardening) and backup capacity budgets, the decisions 
to add backup capacity to a facility also ensures its security. In other words the costs of security 
are assumed to be lumped into the costs of a backup capacity.  Such an assumption is reasonable 
when contingent backup planning is prioritized over the security of the facility itself, since it 
does not restrict the investment to security at the expense of backup capacity investments.  
 
  Fourth, using different network topologies based on initial base capacity distributions, it 
is investigated whether a centralized or dispersed backup capacity is appropriate for a given 
network. It is shown that dispersed backups contribute more to risk diversification and loss 
mitigation in non-identical capacity network than in networks with identical distribution of initial 
capacity. 
 
Fifth, congestion impacts on protection decisions are evaluated by explicit modeling of 
non-linear congestion costs in the objective function of the proposed tri-level game theoretic 
model. Piecewise linearization of the congestion cost function is developed to reformulate and 








1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents literature study. 
The relevant literature intersecting different research domains are developed and common 
features with existing gaps are identified. In Chapter 3, we study the responsive contingency 
planning problem. Section 3.2 formulates the problem and the key decisions to be made.  Section 
3.3 and 3.4 are concerned with the model formulation and solution methodology development 
respectively. Section 3.5 presents the numerical results and computational efficiency of the 
proposed algorithm. This Chapter ends with a summary in Section 3.6.  
 
In Chapter 4, we analyze the congestion effects in responsive contingency planning. We 
present the congestion cost function and its linearization technique and the revised tri-level 
model under congestion effects along with the solution methodology in Section 4.2.  In Section 
4.3 results and analysis for this part of the dissertation is presented. Chapter concludes with a 
summary in Section 4.4.  The Chapter 5 of the dissertation presents the conclusion and the future 









The related literature to this dissertation intersects research domains in critical 
infrastructure protection, location planning and supply chain risk management. The articles 
covered have a focus towards one or more risk mitigation aspects including reliable, robust, 
responsive or resilient system designs. Specifically, we review reliable facility location models in 
location planning domain, the interdiction-fortification models in critical infrastructure 
protection planning domain and contingent planning models in supply chain risk management. 
The focus of the literature study is to identify the protection or risk mitigation aspects considered  
and their modeling and solution approaches.   
 
2.2 Strategic Design Models of Protection  
 
The supply network vulnerability to disruption can be mitigated by considering risks 
during initial network designs. A large reduction in risk can generally be achieved through a 
relatively small increase in the costs of facility location when their disruption probabilities are 
accounted in the network design stages (Snyder and Daskin, 2007). The objective in such models 
is to achieve a reliable system that can perform at low cost both during disruptions and normal 
times.  
 
The underlying facility location problem in most strategic design models is formulated 
either as a p median (Lee 2001, Snyder and Daskin 2005, Berman, Krass and Menezes 2007, Li, 
Zeng and Savachkin 2013) or a fixed charge location problem (Snyder and Daskin 2005, Lim, 
Daskin, Bassambo and Chopra 2010, Cui, Ouyang and Shen 2010, Li and Ouyang 2010, Shen, 
Zhan and Zhang 2011, Aboolian, Cui and Shen 2012, Li et al. 2013).  In p median formulation, 
the number of facilities to be located is known (=p) and there is no fixed set up costs involved in 
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locating these facilities. The expected total costs are formulated as expected costs of 
transportation, i.e., the expected costs of serving customers (e.g. retailers) through facilities (e.g. 
warehouses) measured as demand weighted distances from the customers to the facilities. In 
fixed charge location problems, number of facilities to be located is an endogenous decision as 
fixed costs are involved in locating facilities. The expected total costs are obtained as the sum of 
total fixed costs of facility location (independent of disruptions) and expected transportation 
costs under disruption risks. 
 
The basic strategic design models involve decisions of opening a set of facilities, all of 
which have chances of being disrupted, i.e., all facilities unreliable (Lee 2001, Berman et al. 
2007 and Berman et al. 2009). Some models have considered simultaneous locations of reliable 
and unreliable facilities (Snyder and Daskin 2005, Lim et al. 2010, Cui et al. 2010, Li and 
Ouyang 2010, Shen et al. 2011, Aboolian et al. 2012). Reliable facilities in these models are the 
ones that never get disrupted but their fixed costs of locations are higher than the unreliable 
facilities, otherwise there is no incentive in opening of unreliable facilities. Li et al. (2013) 
considers the problem of locating a set of unreliable facilities in which some unreliable facilities 
can be fortified (protected against disruption) utilizing a limited fortification budget. Therefore 
the decisions involve which facilities to open and which among them to fortify.  
 
 Strategic design models are based on the optimization of some measures of central 
tendency such as expected costs, expected profits, etc. which require explicit incorporation of 
disruption probabilities. Therefore, an implicit assumption in these models is that facility 
disruption probability are known or can be readily estimated. It is either incorporated as a 
scenario probability (q) or as individual facility failure probability (p) parameter. When scenario 
probability is utilized, disruptions are modeled as explicit scenarios, each scenario consist of a 
set of facility disruptions and a known probability. When disruptions are modeled with explicit 
scenarios, assignment of demands is based on these scenarios. Each scenario specifies which 
facility will be disrupted and which will be operational in the planning horizon. If a facility fails 
in a given scenario, demand is routed to the nearest other operational facility. Under scenario 
probabilities, the problem is formulated as a two stage stochastic programming model, where 
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location decisions are made at the first stage before knowing which scenario will occur and the 
assignment of demands is made at the second stage after random disruptions occur. The solution 
of this is based on standard methods in stochastic linear programming (Higle, 2005).  
 
When individual facility failure probability is known,  specific demand assignment rules 
are  defined to route demands from a disrupted facility to the nearest undisrupted facility. Snyder 
and Daskin (2007) consider a “level assignment” rule, in which facilities are arranged at several 
levels in increasing order of distance from the demands. If nearest facility to the demand fails, 
then reassignment is to the next nearest facility at a higher level. This assignment strategy allows 
allocation of demands to a primary facility under normal conditions, and to a set of backup 
facilities when the primary facility is disrupted. However, this approach of modeling disruption 
makes the model complex and intractable when disruption probabilities are non-uniform and the 
number of facilities are large. Therefore most models are formulated on the assumptions of 
identical disruption probability, i.e. all facilities have the same disruption probability. This 
assumption is relaxed in Cui et al. (2010) and Qi et al. (2010). Li and Ouyang (2010) extends 
this by considering correlation effects of facility disruption. The model considers that the 
probability of disruption of a facility is affected by the disruption of a nearby facility.   
 
The design models utilizing probabilistic disruptions and central tendency measures focus 
on reliability improvements. Their solutions lead to network designs that may not perform 
adequately under extreme conditions imposed by a major disruptive event. More robust 
strategies and risk-averse approaches are required to manage major disruptions. A few authors 
have considered robustness in strategic location of facilities so that the network is protected from 
worst case losses under a major disruption (O’Hanley and Church 2011, Peng, Snyder, Lim and 
Liu 2011, Aksen and Aras 2012). Peng et al. (2011) considers opening facilities in the network 
so that the performance under disruption scenario does not deviate much from its performance 
under normal (non-disruption) scenario. They apply a criteria called p-robustness (Snyder and 
Daskin 2006), to optimize performance (costs) subject to a constraint requiring relative regret in 
each disruption scenario to be no more than a worst accepted (p) level. O’Hanley and Church 
(2011) utilizes a maximal covering formulation to locate facilities, which simultaneously 
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maximizes pre-disruption coverage and post disruption worst-case coverage. The model is 
presented in a bi-level framework in which the post disruption worst-case coverage is modeled at 
the lower level in the form of an interdictor who attempts to minimize the coverage through 
attacks on located facilities. At the upper level facility location decisions are made to 
simultaneously maximize the pre and post disruption coverages. Similar to O’Hanley and Church 
(2011), Aksen and Aras (2012) also utilize a bi-level framework, with lower level used to model 
the worst case loss.  However, the underlying formulation is a fixed charge location problem 
unlike the maximum covering formulation in O’Hanley and Church (2011). Their model 
additionally incorporates fortification and capacity expansion decisions integrated with the 
facility location decisions. Strategic design models involving protection or fortification decisions 
have been studied most recently in Bricha and Nourelfath (2013) and Jalali, Seifbarghy and 
Niaki (2018). These models are different to other models in that they apply a different concept of 
contest success function (Hausken, 2011) to model independent facility disruptions. While both 
apply game theoretic modeling approach to seek optimal protection strategy in an uncapacitated 
fixed charge location supply network, the location decisions are made ahead of protection 
decisions in Bricha and Nourelfath (2013) and are based on expected costs (utilities) measures 
(risk neutral), Jalali et al. (2018) considers protection decisions in the design stage by integrating 
the two decisions together and takes a risk averse approach.   
 
It is important to note that while facility location is a major decision in all strategic design 
models, their applicability is limited to the planning of new networks. In existing networks 
facility relocation is not a viable option due to associated costs. Another stream of research 
focuses on protection of systems that are already existing and for which relocating facilities is 
cost prohibitive.  This research stream specifically addresses network and infrastructure security 
and vulnerability mitigation and models are commonly referred as interdiction and fortification 






2.3 Interdiction and Fortification Models of Protection 
 
Interdiction can be defined as a deliberate or intentional attack on the critical elements of 
a network system to disrupt or deteriorate its performance. Interdiction models have been applied 
in the literature to assess system vulnerability to disruptions or to identify the most critical 
elements of the system, whose loss deteriorate the performance the most. Fortification should be 
understood as a mechanism to enhance protection of such critical system components so that 
system disruption can be controlled. Fortification of facilities or infrastructure may involve 
investments for structural reinforcements, for example, seismic designs to protect against 
earthquakes, structural barriers to control flood, etc. It can also be achieved through some 
redundancy in the system, for example strategic stocks or inventory, backup resource, multiple 
sourcing, offshoring business, etc.  The mathematical models that apply protection of the system 
and its components through these fortification measures are commonly known as fortification 
models.  
 
2.3.1 Interdiction models 
 
Interdiction models identify critical facilities (facility interdiction models) or network 
arcs (network interdiction models) whose disruption can create the greatest loss of system 
efficiency. Network interdiction were the earliest problems studied and involve removal of arcs 
from a network commonly involving objectives of minimizing maximum flow between origin 
and destination (Wollmer, 1964) and maximizing the shortest paths between supply and demands 
(Fulkerson and Harding 1977, Israeli and Wood 2002), etc. A survey of network interdiction 
models and their variants can be found in Church, Scaparra, & Middleton (2004).  
 
In the context of facilities, the interdiction models are concerned with the identification of 
critical facilities whose failures represent worst-case system losses (Church et al. 2004; Church 
and Scaparra 2007a, 2007b; Losada et al. 2010a; O’Hanley and Church 2011), Losada et al. 
2012a). The models have been based on two classical facility location models: a) p median b) 
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max covering. The interdiction models with max covering type formulation (r interdiction 
covering problem) involve decisions of identifying a subset (r) of existing facilities whose 
interdiction/disruption can result in a maximal coverage loss. In p median based interdiction 
models (r interdiction median (rIM) models) the decisions involve removing/disrupting r number 
of facilities from the existing set of facilities so as to maximize the total cost of reassignment of 
demands, i.e., the demand weighted distances to the operational facilities post interdiction.  
 
Church et al. (2004) presents MIP formulation of both r interdiction covering and the 
median models. The parameter r is deterministic in these models. Church and Scaparra (2007a) 
and Losada et al. (2012a) extended the study by considering r as probabilistic. Losada et al. 
(2010a) introduced recovery time aspects in the rIM model. Their study demonstrate that worst 
case losses may be underestimated if recovery times are ignored by the models, especially if the 
impacts associated with prolonged disruption are significant.  
 
2.3.2 Fortification models 
 
The worst case losses from a major disruption can be avoided through protection of 
critical facilities identified by the interdiction model. While planning defense under intentional 
attacks (e.g. terror attacks) however, the solutions provided by the interdiction models are not 
always reliable. This is because intelligent adversaries can adjust their actions to circumvent the 
defender’s strategy. This relationship between attack and defense needs to be accounted when 
planning protection against such disruptions (Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron and Wood 2006).  
 
The shortcoming of the interdiction model is addressed through fortification models 
which integrate protection decisions into the mathematical models of interdictions. The models 
take risk averse approach to risk management as fortifications imply protection against possible 
worst-case loss. These models are commonly prescribed in a game theoretic framework to 
capture the elements of dependence and often cast as bi-level optimization models involving 
attack and defense. One of the first models in this direction was proposed by Church and 
Scaparra (2007b) and is called the r-interdiction median model with fortification (rIMF) in 
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which r represents the number of facilities that can be interdicted or attacked. At the upper level 
of this bi-level model, the protection decision involves which of the q facilities to protect by 
optimal allocation of limited protection budget, and at a lower level the decision involves 
identification of the r most critical facilities of an existing p median network.  
 
The mathematical formulation of the rIMF model (Church and Scaparra, 2007b) is 
illustrated here as the model developed in this dissertation is based on similar formulation: 
 
 






=∑  (2.2) 
 {0,1}  jz j J∈ ∀ ∈  (2.3) 
where ( )H z  represents the rIM model, i.e., the lower level interdiction problem  
represented as: 
 
 [rIM]: ( ) maximize i ij ij
i I
H z a d x
∈
= ∑  (2.4) 
 1          j js z j J− ≥ ∀ ∈  (2.5) 









=∑  (2.7) 




x s i I j J
∈
≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑  (2.8) 
 {0,1}         js j J∈ ∀ ∈  (2.9) 




(notations: I- set of demand nodes indexed by i, J- set of existing facilities indexed by j, ia - 
demand of node i, ijd - distance between node i and j, Tij – set of facilities other than the closest 
facility to i , r- number of facilities to be interdicted) 
 
 
The decisions variables are defined as: 
 
1       if facility  is fortified





1       if facility  is interdicted





1       if demand  is assigned to facility  






The worst case loss is represented in the objective function of the lower level rIM 
problem (2.4) which maximizes the weighted distance of demands to facilities through the 
interdiction of r unprotected facilities. Corresponding to this, the objective function of the rIMF 
problem (2.1) at the upper level minimizes this loss by optimally protecting q facilities. The 
integrality of protection variables, interdiction variables and the demand assignment variables are 
represented in (2.3), (2.9) and (2.10) respectively. Constraint (2.2) states the cardinality of 
protected facilities. Constraint (2.5) links the upper level problem to the lower level problem and 
prohibits the attack of protected facilities. Constraint (2.6) states that every demand should be 
assigned to exactly one facility. Constraint (2.7) restricts the number of attack to a maximum of r 
facilities. Constraint (2.8) restrict the allocation of demand to a farther facility if the closer one is 
not interdicted.    
 
Several variants to the basic fortification model (rIMF) have subsequently been studied. 
Liberatore, Scaparra, & Daskin (2011) and Liberatore & Scaparra (2011) considered uncertainty 
in the number of possible facility attacks (i.e., r is probabilistic). In Liberatore et al. (2011) the 
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bi-level rIMF with probabilistic r is reformulated into a max-covering type problem. The 
problem is reduced to a single level which minimizes the expected worst case coverage across all 
possible values of r. Considering the difficulty associated with properly estimating the 
probability of the extent of attacks, Liberatore & Scaparra (2011) utilize a worst case regret as a 
performance measure rather than the expected costs measures utilized in Liberatore et al. (2011). 
The regrets considered represent the maximum deviations of a stochastic solution with unknown 
number of attacks to the solutions if these probabilities were known or deterministic. Losada, 
Scaparra, & O'Hanley (2012b) further introduce temporal dimensions to the basic rIMF model 
through facility recovery time and multiple disruption considerations. Partial disruptions were 
introduced through modeling correlation effects of a facility loss (attack) in Liberatore, Scaparra, 
& Daskin (2012) . The percentage of capacity lost by a facility from disruption of a neighbouring 
facility was represented in a correlation matrix which was utilized in determining facility 
capacities after disruptions. Partial disruptions were also modeled in Aksen, Akca & Aras 
(2014).  
 
It is observed that a majority of the protection models have assumed that facilities are 
uncapacitated. Further, most of the models can be considered as static models of protection since 
they do not incorporate temporal aspect of recovery. Table 2.1 summarizes relevant protection 
planning articles on the features of facility (capacitated or uncapacitated), the risk tolerance 
considered (risk averse/risk neutral) and the implied mitigation strategy (preventive/recovery). 
The strategic design models are largely based on risk neutral approach. Such models take a 
preventive risk mitigation focus as their decisions involve facility location or facility location 
with some redundancy placement decisions e.g. inventory, backup supplier, structural 
reinforcements etc. so that the supply network is inherently reliable (Berman et al. 2007, Cui et 
al. 2010, Lim et al. 2010, Qi et al. 2010, Li and Ouyang 2010, Aboolian et al. 2013, Li et al. 
2013, Bricha and Nourelfath 2013). A majority of models that take risk averse approaches also 
have a preventive mitigation focus and ignore temporal aspect of recovery and contingent 
mechanisms (Church and Scaparra 2007, Scaparra and Church 2008, Aksen et al. 2010, 
Liberatore et al. 2011, Liberarotore and Scaparra 2011, Aksen and Aras 2012, Liberatore et al. 
2012, Scaparra and Church 2012, Jalili et al. 2018). Although under a major disaster, these 
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models lead to a more robust supply flows than the risk neutral models because of their worst 
case loss considerations, they are still inadequate from a resilient and responsive design point of 
view due to the exclusion of temporal aspect of recovery in these models.   
 
Losada et al. (2012b) were the first to introduce recovery time dimension in a protection 
model. The protection is implied as a decision to invest or allocate available budget into facilities 
for reducing their recovery times following disruption. A drawback of this model is that it does 
not explicitly model contingent mechanisms or how the recovery can be enhanced. As well, the 
model is less realistic as it considers uncapacitated facilities. Aksen, Piyade, & Aras (2010) and 
Aksen & Aras (2012) incorporate contingent mechanism in a capacitated model which involves 
capacity expansion decisions for contingent rerouting of demands originally handled by a 
disrupted facility. However, they assume that such capacity expansions occur instantaneously. 
The response time in building these capacities are not considered. Therefore their model 
overestimates actual available capacity during disruption periods. 
 
Although lacking in the domains of reliable facility location or critical infrastructure 
protection planning literature, response and recovery aspects of contingent planning have been 
considered in supply chain risk management literature. The relevant literature are discussed in 






























Snyder and Daskin (2005) √ √ √
Berman et al . (2007) √ √ √
Church and Scaparra (2007b) √ √ √
Jeon et al . (2008) √ √ √ √





Aksen et al . (2010) √ √ √ √
Cui et al . (2010) √ √ √
Lim et al.  (2010) √ √ √ √
Li and Ouyang (2010) √ √ √ √
Qi et al. (2010) √ √ √ √
Liberatore et al.  (2011) √ √ √
Liberatore and Scaparra (2011) √ √ √
O'Hanley and Church (2011) √ √
Peng et al . (2011) √ √ √
Aksen and Aras (2012) √ √ √ √ √
Liberatore et al . (2012) √ √ √
Losada et al.  (2012b) √ √ √
Mak and Shen (2012) √ √ √ √
Scaparra and Church (2012) √ √ √
Aboolian et al.  (2012) √ √ √
Bricha and Nourelfath (2013) √ √ √ √
Li et al.  (2013) √ √ √ √












2.4 Contingent Planning Models of Protection  
 
Several contingent mechanisms of disruption exist, such as inventory, dual sourcing, 
contingent re-routing and backup capacity. The seminal work by Tomlin (2006) considers 
backup capacity and inventory measures for handling demand fluctuations and random 
disruptions. Their model identifies inventory as an appropriate mechanism for frequent and short 
disruptions of the main supplier while dual sourcing is optimal for rare and long or major 
disruptions. Whenever a backup supplier has a flexible capacity, contingent re-routing is a 
preferable mechanism. In considering the flexible backup supplier, it is assumed that the whole 
backup capacity is available only after a response time and there is no supply from the backup 
capacity during the response time.  Hopp and Yin (2006) and Schmitt (2011) also make the same 
assumption as Tomlin on backup capacity availability during the response time. On a different 
premise, Klibi and Martel (2012) propose a discrete stepwise function to represent the gradual 
capacity availability based on the intensity of disruption and time to recovery. A two echelon 
supply chain with production facilities involving dedicated manufacturing system (DMS) and a 
reconfigurable manufacturing systems (RMS) is considered in Niroomand et al. (2012). The 
RMS is considered as a volume flexible backup resource with partial availability of the capacity 
within the response time.  
 
Response speed of backup production is a critical decision determining the effectiveness 
of protection strategy utilizing contingent capacity adjustments. Wang & Koren (2012) present 
several backup facility configurations affecting the supply chain responsiveness levels in a cost 
and response time trade-off analysis. In a serial configuration, the added capacity can only 
become available after completing the reconfiguration process of all stages. This makes the 
transition to required capacity slow despite the low cost of reconfiguration and the use of simpler 
machine structure. On the other hand, in a pure parallel configuration, each machine could go 
under a reconfiguration process independently, which leads to a faster transition speeds. A higher 
configuration cost may result with parallel configuration since machine structure is more 






The literature review suggests that there have been quite limited study related to 
protection planning of supply chain considering the response and recovery mechanisms. 
Furthermore, most of the study have considered uncapacitated systems and ignore congestion 
effects due to overflow during recovery. Models based on such assumptions are less practical 
and lead to unrealistic protection solutions although they are mathematically more tractable. The 
challenges in solving capacitated and congested network models have yet not been addressed 
adequately in the literature. The fortification models with responsiveness consideration under a 
capacitated facilities and flow congestion effects are non-existent, despite the importance of such 
models in managing major disruption risks.   
 
Relying on the interdiction-fortification framework discussed above, in this dissertation 
we therefore develop a new mathematical model for contingency planning under major 
disruption. In the first part of the dissertation we introduce rIMF type formulation of the 
protection model in which contingency strategy is realized through a backup production with 
response time considerations (Chapter 3).  In the second part of the dissertation (Chapter 4), we 
demonstrate that congestion related costs influence protection decisions and reformulate the 










This chapter introduces the responsive contingency planning model developed for 
managing disruption risks of a capacitated supply network.  The disruption contingencies can be 
implemented more effectively when proper planning is done and appropriate mechanisms are 
identified ahead of the disaster events. Contingent capacity adjustments through back up 
production is proposed as mechanism to enhance recovery. The level of responsiveness of this 
contingent mechanism relies on optimal selection of production volumes and response speeds of 
a backup production. The appropriate level of responsiveness need to be determined ahead of 
disruption so that backup production capability can be designed accordingly and implemented 
during disaster periods.  
 
The developed model provides a unified framework for planning security and recovery in a 
supply network subject to premeditated attacks on its facilities. Supply chain strategic and 
tactical level decision problems involving facility security and backup capacity management are 
solved while the operational level demand assignments are executed in an optimal manner. 
Relying on a game theoretic modeling framework to capture the elements of dependence 
between attacks and defense observed in intentional attacks (Brown et al., 2006), the 
mathematical model is formulated as a tri-level mixed integer optimization problem. A solution 
algorithm based on implicit enumeration of defense strategies is proposed to arrive at decisions 
involving (i) which facilities to protect with backup production capability (ii) what should be the 
volume of a backup production (iii) what should be the response speed of a backup production. 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 
respectively present the problem and the model formulation. Section 3. 4 discusses the solution 
methodology. In Section 3.5 numerical results and analysis is presented. The chapter ends with a 
summary in Section 3.6.   
 
 
3.2 Problem Formulation 
 
Consider a network of multiple capacitated facilities supplying a set of customers with a 
single product (Figure 3.1). Let I be the set of customer zones. Each customer zone i ϵ I has a 
specific product demand hit in time period t in the planning horizon T. The demands are satisfied 
from the existing set of facilities J, each characterized by a maximum supply capacity vj . Let dij 
represent the distances involved in transporting a unit demand to customer zone i ϵ I from 
facility j ϵ J. These distances are proxies for unit costs of transportation. We assume that the 
facilities are subject to disruptions in which all of its existing capacity is lost for the entire 
recovery period lasting a finite number of time periods t ϵ T. If a facility is disrupted, the 
demands of the customer zones it originally served are rerouted to the next nearest operational 
facility with adequate capacity to accommodate such demands. Demands are split among 
neighboring facilities if a single facility is not capable of fulfilling all of these demands. Unmet 
demands due to inadequate supply capacity are considered lost in the system and incur the cost 





Figure 3.1: Single echelon supply network problem illustration 
 
 
Disruption to the system is modeled as an attack on facilities of the supply network by an 
intelligent attacker who has prior information of the system and is capable of causing maximum 
damage to the system (worst-case). A worst-case system disruption always results from attacks if 
none of the system components (facilities) are protected because the attacker can deploy his 
budget to attack the most vulnerable sets of facilities. System operating costs are maximized 
through such attacks, either because the customer demands need to be assigned to more distant 
facilities, or due to lost sales incurred owing to inadequate system capacity, or both.  
 
To counter attacks and the possible losses, the system planner with limited protection 
budget B designs protection of the network through building security and enhancing recovery. A 
protection cost cjl is involved in securing (fortifying) a facility j with backup production 
capability at a certain level l. The levels of backup capability are determined by the nominal 
volume of production capacities and response speeds of such capacity additions. It is further 
assumed that fortification of facilities is linked to backup production decisions. In other words, 
the decisions to add capacity backups on a facility also implies its fortification. The protection 
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design therefore involves identification of the facilities to be fortified, selecting the optimal 
volume and response speeds of capacity backups in fortified facilities, and the contingent re-






Figure 3.2: Decision stages of the proposed problem 
 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 3.2, the protection design relates to solving strategic to tactical 
level decisions which include securing facilities and deciding on their backup production 
capabilities for contingent capacity adjustments during disruptions. The operational decision is 
the recourse action or the contingent allocation of demands which is a function of facility 
security and the backup production capability, since these two factors together determine the 






3.3 Tri level D-A-D model for responsive contingency planning  
 
The responsive contingency planning problem for managing disruptions risks of 
intentional attacks is formulated as a tri-level optimization model within a game-theoretic 
framework. The model conceptually involves a sequential game amongst three players at 
different levels of hierarchy: i) supply chain planner (system defender, D) at the top level 
determines the facilities to be protected with back up production capability to minimize the 
worst-case losses due to disruptions; ii) the interdictor (attacker, A), at the middle level, 
identifies the set of facilities that can be attacked to create the worst-case losses from disruptions; 
and iii) supply chain operator (system user, D) identifies the most cost effective way of operation 
post attacks. Figure 3.3 provides a schematic of the modeling framework of the proposed 





Figure 3.3. Tri-level D-A-D model framework 
 
 




Table 3.1 Notations used in Responsive Contingency Planning Model Formulation 
 
Sets and Parameters: 
I  set of customers (indexed by i)   
J  set of facilities (indexed by j) 
B   total fortification budget  
cjl cost of protection of facility j at level l  
mtl  a multiplier representing the proportion of extra capacity available each time period 
during the response time and after, based on selected response speeds of facilities  
dij distance from customer zone i to facility j  
hit  demand of customer i in time period t 
vjt  base supply capacity of facility j in time period t 
ajl  maximum additional capacity at facility j for corresponding     fortification level l 
ßi unit cost of lost sales for unserved demand from customer i 
r  number of (facility) interdictions 
Decision variables: 
xijt demand quantities from customer zone  i served by facility j in time period t  
sj  1 if facility j is interdicted and 0 otherwise 
zjl  1 if facility j is fortified with capacity backups at level l, 0 otherwise 
uit total unmet demand of customer i in time period t 
 
The decisions made at the upper levels are parameterized at the lower levels. 
Mathematically, this nested decision framework is represented as a hierarchical mixed integer 
optimization problem as follows.  
 
 [DLP]: ( )min  
z
H z   (3.1) 
 subject to: 
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The decision framework comprises three optimization problems. The system planner or 
the defender level problem (DLP) is represented by Equations (3.1) – (3.4). This part of the 
problem models the defense of the supply network from worst-case attacks. The decisions at this 
level are represented by binary variables zjl which is 1 if a facility j is protected at level l and 0 
otherwise (constraint 4). Levels of protection (l =1…L) represent a selected combination of 
capacity and response speeds that define backup production capability and are therefore 
dependent on the available sizes (volumes) of capacity and response speeds for capacity 
backups; for instance,  2 levels of capacity and 2 levels of response speed will result in four 




The problem represented by Equations (3.5) – (3.8) is associated with the attacker level 
problem (ALP). The decisions at this level are represented by binary variables sj which are set to 
1 if the facility is attacked and 0 otherwise. The ALP is concerned with the maximization of 
system loss by controlling the variables sj. Finally the problem represented in Equations (3.9)–
(3.13) is associated with the user level problem (ULP) where the decisions are represented in the 
non-negative flow variables xijt  and a dummy variable representing the unmet demands uit.  
 
The decisions made at the DLP problem are parameterized in the ALP problem. 
Similarly, the decisions made at the DLP and ALP problems are parameterized in the ULP 
problem. The objective of the system planner is to protect the system by minimizing the 
maximum system operational cost the attacker can create (Equation 3.1). The vector of 
protection strategy, Z = (z11, z21,… zJL), corresponds to a vector of investments costs C = (c11, c21, 
….cJL). Hence the system planner is constrained by protection budget B available to him. Further, 
a facility can only be protected at one level.   
 
The objective of the attacker contradicts to that of the system planner. The attacker 
targets a set of unprotected facilities in order to maximally raise the system operational costs 
through his attacks (Equation 3.5). Constraint (3.6) defines the number of facilities that can be 
simultaneously attacked. The DLP problem is linked to the ALP problem through constraint 
(3.7). It prohibits the attack on protected facilities.  
 
Following protection and attacks, the system operator seeks a minimum cost assignment 
of demands to the remaining supply facilities. This is represented in the objective function of the 
ULP (Equation 3.9). This objective function comprises two terms: the first term represents the 
transportation (flow) costs of the demands that are met (cFlow), and the second term represents 
the cost of lost sales (cLS) if the system capacity is inadequate to completely fill the demands. 
Any demands that cannot be met in a given time period due to insufficient system capacity are 
accounted as lost sales units in constraint (3.10). Constraint (3.11) specifies that the total 
demands handled by each facility in each time period cannot exceed the available total capacity 
of that facility. The assumption here is that a facility if protected has its total capacity equal to its 
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base (original) capacity plus the backup capacity, whereas if a facility is attacked, it loses all of 
its base capacity and no demands can be assigned to it. Gradual capacity addition in each time 
period is reflected in the parameter mtl, which is the proportion of selected capacity size (volume) 
that can be added in time period t for a selected response speed or a selected level of protection.  
 
 
3.4 Solution Methodology 
 
In order to identify facilities to be protected and to obtain the optimal capacity and 
response speeds of a backup resource in a contingency strategy, a tree search algorithm is 
presented. This algorithm explores optimal solution of the proposed model through a binary tree 




 Game theoretic attack-defense modeling framework involving bi-level optimization has 
been widely applied for optimizing protection of critical infrastructure with applications in 
supply chains, telecommunications, electric power grids, railways and pipeline networks, etc. 
This modeling framework is suitable for solving resource allocation problems in order to counter 
strategic risks such as malicious attacks (Golany, Kaplan, Marmur and Rothblum, 2009). Bi-
level optimization problems are however, difficult to solve especially when they involve integer 
decisions at both levels (Moore and Bard, 1990). This is because of the nested structure which 
makes the solution of the lower level problem a function of the upper level problem and the 
solution of the upper level problem a function of the lower level problem. Church and Scaparra 
(2007b) applied the bi-level optimization framework to plan for fortification of supply facilities 
which would minimize the worst case losses due to attacks on a finite number of facilities of the 
supply chain network. The difficulty in solving the bi-level problem is handled in this model 
through reformulation into more tractable single level mixed integer linear programming (MIP) 
problem which is solved using the general purpose commercial MIP solver. The limitation of the 
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approach is that only a small sized instances can be solved using this approach since it requires 
seeking integer decisions of protection and demand allocations through explicit enumeration of 
attack scenarios. Scaparra and Church (2008b) develop an alternative MIP formulation and 
exploit the mathematical structure of the reformulated problem to obtain the lower and upper 
bounds which is used to reduce the size of the original model. Decomposition techniques 
involving cutting plane algorithms such as Benders decomposition (Losada et al., 2012b) and 
duality techniques (Wood, 1993) which involves taking dual of the inner problem to formulate it 
in a nested min-min or max-max structure are other common approaches of solving these type of  
problems.  
 
One of the widely used approach for handling these problems is due to Scaparra and 
Church (2008a) who apply implicit enumeration algorithm tailored to the bilevel structure of 
their interdiction fortification problem. The conjecture of this algorithm is that at least one of the 
candidate facilities in the worst case attack should be protected for minimizing the impacts of 
such attacks. Implicit enumeration algorithm utilizes this conjecture in a recursive search tree to 
find the optimal protection strategy. The main advantage of this approach is that it does not face 
the size restrictions or complicated reformulations as in the previous algorithms of Church and 
Scaparra (2007b) and  Scaparra and Church (2008b). This approach has subsequently been used 
in Aksen et al. (2010), Cappanera & Scaparra (2011), Scaparra & Church (2012) and Liberatore 
et al. (2011, 2012).  
 
Our solution methodology is an extension of the implicit enumeration algorithm (IE) in 
Scaparra & Church (2008a). The search process in our algorithm is more extended than that of 
Scaparra & Church due to the considerations of different levels of facility protection. A more 
important difference is that while Scaparra & Church solve a mixed integer problem (MIP) at 
every child nodes of the search tree to identify attacked facilities at the lower level, we solve all 
of the problems as LP. This is possible in our algorithm because we arrive at the solution of the 
attacker’s problem (ALP) by independently solving all of the lower level problems (ULP) for 
each attack scenario. This means attack decisions are inputs to our ULP problem, as a result of 
which it involves only continuous decision variables. Given the fact that computational effort of 
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the IE approach depends on the difficulty of solving the MIP in the lower level interdiction 
problem (Scaparra & Church, 2008a), our approach does not encounter similar difficulty other 
than the need to enumerate feasible attack patterns at each node. This however does not severely 
deteriorate the computational performance of our algorithm. The computational performance is 




3.4.2 Algorithm description  
 
In the proposed algorithm, the search tree starts by creating a root node where facilities 
involved in worst-case attack of r facilities is identified. The worst case attack is the attack on 
facilities when there is no protection/fortification involved and the damage to the system is 
maximum. In other words, at the root node we obtain solutions for the attacker level problem 
(ALP) when the system is totally unprotected and hence the attacker is able to create maximum 
loss in the system through the attacks on selected facilities.  
 
A pseudo code for implementing root node algorithm is presented in Table 3.2. At its 
initialization, all the protection variables zjl in the root node are set to zero and all the 
combinations of attack scenarios involving r facility attacks are enumerated. Every attack 
scenario p involves a vector of facility attacks (sj). For every attack scenario p, the user level 
problem (ULP) can be solved using a commercial LP solver. Note that solving ULP does not 
involve any integer decisions as the attack and protection decisions are parameterized at this 
level. After solving ULP for all attack scenarios, the corresponding values of total transportation 
costs and the total lost sales costs are normalized with respect to their ranges. Steps 6-10 in Table 
2 illustrate normalization of costs after ULP is solved for all attack scenarios. Normalization 
scales the two cost components (cost of lost sales and the transportation or the flow costs) 




In this algorithm, the ALP problem is not solved explicitly but its solution is obtained by 
solving several instances of ULP problems, which are linear programming problems (LP) with 
all non-integer decision variables. The ALP solution is obtained through a sequence of steps: a) 
solution of multiple instances of ULP (as many as the number of feasible attack scenarios) b) 
normalization of costs across all scenarios and c) identification of attack scenario with highest 
normalized total cost. The attack scenario leading to maximum normalized total costs is 
considered the worst-case attack scenario, and hence the ULP solutions for this scenario are also 
the solutions of the ALP problem for this node.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Root Node Algorithm 
 
Pseudo-code: Solving attacker problem (ALP) at root node  
1. ∀ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑙𝑙  𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  ← 0 
2. enumerate P = nCr attack combinations 
3. for p = 1 ….., P \\ attack scenarios 
4.    Solve ULP for (𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝)  
5. end for 
6. 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆 ← minimum (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆1, … . 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃); 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ← minimum (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1, … . 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃) 
7. 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆 ← maximum (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆1, … . 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃); 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ← maximum (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1, … . 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃) 
8. for p = 1…P 
9.    𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝 ← � 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
� ; 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 ← � 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
� \\ normalization of 
costs 
   𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝  ← 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 \\ normalized total cost 
end for 
10. 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ← maximum (𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1, … .𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃) 
11.  𝑆𝑆∗ ← { 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝: 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛};  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆∗← { 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝: 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}; 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∗← { 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝: 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛}; 





The facilities attacked in the worst-case attack scenario (𝑆𝑆∗) obtained as a solution to the 
ALP problem in the root node, should be the constituents for protection if worst-case loss is to be 
avoided. This is as per the observation made in Scaparra & Church (2008). The rationale for this 
is that for avoiding worst-case loss, one of the facilities from the attacked member set in the 
worst-case attack has to be protected. If this is not the case, then the attacker is always free to 
attack facilities in this set and create maximum loss. The enumeration tree therefore proceeds 
from the root node by binary branching on protection variables, which are one of the facilities j 
from among the candidate sets ( 𝑆𝑆∗) identified in the root node solution. The flow chart of the 
search tree is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
 
 In the left branch of the enumeration tree the decision is to protect facility j at a selected 
level of protection. The facility to protect is selected arbitrarily from the candidate sets in the 
root node. As protection costs vary depending on the selected protection level, it is necessary to 
compute the remaining budget at each node before branching from it. If the remaining budget is 
inadequate to protect any of the candidate facilities, then this node is fathomed and becomes a 
leaf node (i.e., a node without any child node). If the budget is adequate for protecting a selected 
facility, sub-branches are created along this branch for each allowable protection level. The sub-
branch is pruned if this level of protection cannot be achieved. For example, if there are four 
levels of protection available, depending on the budget available there can be up to four sub-
branches each leading to a child node. In each of these sub-branches, the corresponding zjl 
variable is set to 1, which indicates that the selected facility j is protected at a level l along that 
branch. The ULP is then solved at each of these child nodes by iteratively calling a commercial 
LP solver for each feasible attack scenario. Feasible scenarios are all the different combinations 
of attack scenarios involving r facility attacks from a set of n unprotected facilities. Once the 
ULP is solved for all feasible attack scenarios, the two cost components are normalized and the 
worst-case attack scenario is identified as the one leading to the maximum total normalized 
costs. Identification of the worst case attack scenario provides new sets of candidate facilities to 






Figure 3.4: Flowchart of the search tree 
 
 
The search tree progresses according to a depth-first strategy: at every node, arbitrarily 
selecting facilities to protect from the candidate sets; creating new child nodes for every level of 
protections that the budget allows; and fathoming those nodes with inadequate budget for further 
protection. At every unfathomed child node that follows, the LP solver is called iteratively for 
solving ULP with all feasible attack scenarios, taking into account the facilities protected until 
this node. After solving ULP for all attack scenarios, costs are normalized and solutions to the 
ALP problem is obtained. The size of the feasible attack scenarios for solving ULP reduces with 
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the depth of the search tree. This is because more number of facilities are protected further down 
the tree and therefore cannot be attacked.  
 
In the right branch to every parent node, a child node is reached by first setting all 
protection variables corresponding to facility j protected on the left branch to zero (i.e., zjl = 0 for 
every l) and updating the candidate sets for protection by eliminating facility j from it. If the 
updated set is empty, this child node becomes a leaf node. Otherwise, branching from this node 
is continued in the aforementioned manner. The tree search terminates when there are no nodes 
remaining for further branching in any of the branches (i.e., all nodes are leaf nodes). This can 
happen for two reasons: either the candidate sets for protection are empty, or the budget is 
inadequate for further protection of a candidate facility identified in the parent node. 
 
At the termination of the search tree, the costs of lost sales (cLS) and the transportation 
costs (cFlow) obtained as an optimal ALP solution at each leaf nodes are normalized to scale 
these costs between 0 and 1 by comparing all leaf node solutions (refer to Section 4.2.2). The 
leaf node with smallest normalized total cost is selected as the optimal solution to the tri-level 
problem. The optimal sets of facilities to be protected and their corresponding levels of backup 
capacity and response speeds are obtained by backtracking the path from that node to the root 
node.  
 
3.4.3 Illustration of the proposed methodology 
 
The proposed methodology is illustrated by generating a binary tree to solve a simple 
problem with five facilities, and ten demand zones. The five facilities are located in five states in 
the US (NY, CA, IL, TX and PA). Among these facilities, two facilities are to be interdicted by 
the attacker (r = 2). Two levels of capacity volumes (high, low) and two levels of response speed 
levels (high, low) are considered, the combination of which leads to four different levels (l) of 
protection. The levels of protection are designated as: level 1—high capacity volume with high 
response speeds; level 2—high capacity volume with low response speeds; level 3—low capacity 




The available protection budget (B) is assumed to be just sufficient to allow capacity 
additions up to two facilities when the lowest levels of available capacity volume and response 
speeds are selected. The costs of protection have been considered to be independent of facilities 
but are dependent on the selected volume and response speeds of capacity backups.  
 
The illustrative problem highlights the branching and pruning rules, cost data 
normalization and identification of optimal defense strategy through backtracking.  
 
3.4.3.1 Branching, pruning and nodes traversal 
The enumeration tree corresponding to this illustrative problem is depicted in Figures 
(3.5a) – (3.5c). Every node of this enumeration tree is characterized by the following facility and 
costs data:  
 
• Candidate sets of facilities for protection in the next stage (S): this includes a set of 
facilities attacked in the optimal attack, which maximizes the value of total normalized 
costs. 
• Cost of lost sales (cLS), which is the absolute numerical value of total lost sales costs 




itiuβ  under the optimal attack scenario for this 
node). 
• Flow costs (cFlow), which is the absolute numerical value of transportation (flow) costs  
(i.e., computation of expression ∑∑∑
∈ ∈ =Ii Jj
T
1t
ijijtdx  under the optimal attack scenario for this 
node). 
 
Additionally, for creating new branches and for progression of the search tree, the algorithm 




• Sets of facilities protected up to the current node with their levels of protection (i.e., list of 
zjl variables that are set to 1 in this branch until the progression to this node). 
• Remaining budget after protection of facilities until this node in this branch. 
 
At the root node of the tree in Figure (3.5a), the attacker problem is solved without any 
facilities being protected by the defender. The worst-case attack plan is obtained for S*= {CA, 
TX}. Among these two facilities, the facility at CA is arbitrarily selected for protection. The 
available budget is enough to protect CA at any of the 2, 3, or 4 levels of protection except level 
1 for which the budget falls short. So three new nodes B, C and D are created in this branch 
corresponding to protection of CA at levels l = 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Note that node A is never 
reached due to insufficient budget for l = 1 level of protection, and this branch is therefore 
pruned (shown with a zigzagged line). The attacker level problem is solved at each of the nodes 
B, C, and D given that the facility at CA is protected at level 2 for node B, at level 3 for node C 























The other child node obtained from the root node corresponds to the branch ZCA,l = 0 (i.e., 
the facility at CA is not protected at any level l which leaves S = {TX}. Since no budget is used 
so far in this branch, the available budget is adequate to protect TX at levels 2, 3, 4 but not 1. 
Hence the branching is continued from this node. On the left branch corresponding to ZTX,l = 1 , 
three new nodes F, G and H are created corresponding to the three levels of protection that can 
be attained. Node E is never reached due to insufficient budget for protection of the TX facility at 
level l = 1, hence this branch is pruned. The right branch from this node corresponds to ZTX,l = 0 
(i.e., the facility at Texas is not protected at any level and thus this branch leads to a node with S 
= {Ø}. Hence this node is fathomed.  
 
The remaining budget at nodes B, C, F and G in Figure 3.5a are insufficient to protect 
further facilities. So these nodes become leaf nodes at this stage. For nodes D and H, the 
remaining budget allows further protection of a facility at l = 4. Figures 3.5b and 3.5c show the 
continuation of branching from these nodes. At node D, the facility at IL is arbitrarily selected 
for protection along the left branch. The available budget only allows a level l = 4 protection for 
this facility, which leads to the node L where the attacker problem can be solved by setting ZCA,4 
=ZIL,4 = 1. This leads to S = {NY,PA}; however, the remaining budget is insufficient for further 
protection of a facility. Hence node L becomes a leaf node. The right branch from node D 
corresponds to ZIL,l = 0, which leads to a node with S = {TX}. Continuing branching on this node 
leads to a leaf node P with S = {NY, PA} on the left branch and a fathomed node with S = {Ø} on 
the right branch.  
 
The node H with S = {CA, IL} is reached from the path with ZCA,l = 0. Hence the 
protection of CA is not allowed in node H or any other child node along this path. This leaves IL 
as the only candidate for branching from node H. The available budget is sufficient to protect IL 
at level l = 4. The left branch from this node, corresponding to protection of IL, leads to node T 
with S = {NY, CA}. Node T becomes a leaf node as the available budget becomes insufficient for 
further protection at this stage. The right branch from node H leads to another fathomed node 
with S = {Ø}, because both CA and IL cannot be protected in this branch.  
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At its termination this enumeration tree results in seven leaf nodes—B, C, F, G, L, P and T—
each with a unique values of  S, cLS and cFlow obtained as ALP solution in these nodes. 
 
 3.4.3.2 Normalization of costs data at the leaf nodes 
 
In order to obtain the optimal solution of the defender, costs data for the seven sets of leaf 
nodes are normalized with respect to the range of values obtained. Normalized values of lost 
sales costs (normcLSn), flow costs (normcFlown) and the total costs (normTotaln) for each node n 
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 n n nnormTotal normcLS normcFlow= +      (3.16) 
 
 













Table 3.3 Values of normalized costs obtained at the leaf nodes of the IE tree 
 
Nodes cLS cFlow normcLS normcFlow normTotal 
B 505 121 0.16 0.31 0.47 
C 568 96 0.34 0.02 0.36 
F 685 117 0.67 0.27 0.94 
G 748 94 0.85 0.00 0.85 
L 450 110 0.00 0.19 0.19 
P 520 180 0.20 1.00 1.20 
T 800 120 1.00 0.30 1.30 
Min 450 94 0 0 0.19 
Max 800 180 1 1 1.30 
 
 
3.4.3.3 Selection of optimal defense strategy 
 
The minimum normalized total costs is obtained for the leaf node L (Table 3.3). Therefore 
this node is selected as the optimal solution for the defender. Backtracking the tree from this 
node to the root node, we obtain facilities at IL and CA as optimal sets of facilities that can be 
protected within the available budget. Further, it can be observed that the protection budget is 
best utilized by adding low level of capacity and low response speeds to both the facilities (i.e., 
both facilities receive level l = 4 of protection. The optimal defense strategy is thus to protect two 
facilities (IL and CA) with low levels of capacity and response speeds. As a result of this 
protection, the attacker will target to attack facilities at NY and PA which will lead to a maximum 





3.5 Results and Analysis 
 
This section reports and discusses computational results obtained with the proposed 
solution methodology. The algorithm was coded in Java and all the problem instances were 
solved using ILOG CPLEX 12.6 solver (using Concert Technology) on a Dell Latitude E5430 
station with an Intel Core i5-3340M processor at 2.7 GHz and 8 GB of RAM running Windows 7 
operating system.  
 
 
3.5.1 Problem instance generation 
 
The test problems for numerical analysis are derived from the data of the largest 
metropolitan areas (by population) according to the US Census Bureau for 2000 (Daskin, 2004). 
The demands are proxy to population and are obtained by dividing the population of the cities by 
103 rounded to the nearest integer. The original network is constructed first by ranking customer 
zones on the basis of its population (demands) size and opening of J  facilities in these zones in 
the order of their ranking. In the problems considered, the demands and facility base capacities 
are held constant for every time periods. The unit costs of transportation from a customer 
demand zone i to facility location j is considered to be proportional to the distances and is 
presented in Appendix 1. The unit cost of lost sales are set at 2% higher than the maximum 
distances of all facility-demand pairs, calculated as: 1.02* max (dij). This ensures that lost sales 
are incurred only if system capacity is inadequate to handle all of the demands.  
 
3.5.1.1 Facility base capacity 
 
 Two different supply networks are considered which have the same total system capacity 
but differ in their distributions of initial (base) facility capacities. In the first network, every 
facility has the same initial capacity every time period.  This is computed by dividing the sum of 
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total demands and built-in slack (idle capacity) by the total number of facilities (3.17). This 
relation means the original network is always capable of meeting the demands fully if all of the 
facilities are functioning. The parameter α in (3.17) represents the idle capacity of the system 














 = ∀ ∈ ∈
 
 
∑  (3.17)  
 
The second network (network 2) has non-identical facility capacities but the same total 
system capacity as of network 1.  Initial facility capacities for this network are assigned such that 
every open facility is able to completely satisfy demand of its nearest customer zone. For every 
time period t, the base facility capacity for a facility j in this network is therefore computed as 
total demand of its nearest customer zone with a finite increment λt (3.18).  
 
 
 ( ): , ,  min       ,   jt kt kj i ij tv h k i I d d j J t Tλ= ∈ = + ∀ ∈ ∈  (3.18)  
 where λt is calculated as: 
 
( ) ( )1 11 : , ,  min 
I J
it kt kj i iji j
t








∑ ∑  (3.19)  
 
 Any remaining system capacity after satisfying the nearest demands to every facility are 
evenly distributed amongst all open facilities. This equally distributed remaining system capacity 




    
 47 
 
3.5.1.2 Backup capacity volumes and response speeds 
 
It is assumed that finite capacity sizes are available for backup capacity additions at low 
(1000 units) and high levels (2000 units). The amount of these backup capacities available 
during the recovery phase depends on response speeds of capacity additions. Capacity additions 
at higher speeds is assumed to take two time periods, whereas at slower speeds three time 
periods are required to add the same amount of capacity. The proportion of capacity mtl that can 
be added each time period at high and low response speeds therefore varies. A time horizon of 
four time periods is considered, for which the proportion of capacities that can be added each 
time period is shown in Table 3.4.  
 
 
Table 3.4 Proportions of capacity added each time period at high and low response speeds 
 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 
Hi 1/2 1 1 1 
Lo 1/3 2/3 1 1 
 
 
3.5.1.3 Capacity addition costs 
 
Unit cost of capacity additions is assumed to have a linear relationship with response 
time. These costs are set at 1 and 2/3 monetary units respectively for the high and low response 
speeds, corresponding to response times of two and three time periods. Adding more capacities 
faster would therefore ensure a highest level of protection but would also lead to higher costs of 
protection, and vice versa. Costs of protection at several combinations of capacity and response 
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speeds (from high to low) are therefore obtained by multiplying the extra capacity sizes (units) 
by unit costs of adding capacity at selected response speeds.  
 
3.5.2 Flow re-allocation vs contingent rerouting operation 
 
Supply flow re-allocation is a contingency operation that allows entire supply flows to be 
re-allocated with an objective of minimizing total operational costs under disruptions. This is 
different to contingent re-routing operation where only the disrupted supply flows are routed to 
the surviving facilities, other network flows remaining undisturbed. We demonstrate the 
comparative effectiveness of the two mechanisms for risk mitigation utilizing a small network 
involving seven facilities, ten demand zones and attack of a single facility. This small network 
size is chosen for the ease of mapping supply flows graphically so that effect of the two different 
contingency operations can be demonstrated clearly. The demands, facility capacities (non-
identical) and distance data are obtained as described in Section 5.1 and are provided in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 3.6a shows the supply flow configuration of an original network under 
consideration when there is no attack and no protection. This configuration is obtained by 
solving the ULP problem by setting all the protection and interdiction variables to zero. In this 
configuration the demands of each customer zone is exactly met from one or more nearest 
facilities. With respect to this original network we consider two cases of contingency operations 






Figure 3.6a: Supply flows of an original network 
 
Figure 3.6b shows the configuration when a facility at New York, NY is attacked, and the 
contingency operation involves redesign of network through supply re-allocations (Case I ). New 
assignments from that of the original network are shown as dotted lines. This configuration can 
be obtained by solving the ULP problem by setting the interdiction variable corresponding to the 
attacked facility NY to 1 i.e.,  sNY  = 1, while keeping all other protection and interdiction 
variables as zero.  
 
  
Figure 3.6b: Supply flows of a redesigned 
network with flow re-allocations 
 
Figure 3.6c: Supply flows of a network with  
contingently rerouted flows after disruption 
 
The configuration in Figure 3.6c results when the facility at NY is attacked (sNY  = 1), but 
the contingency plan involves only rerouting of supply originally handled by NY (Case II). 
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This requirement means only the demands of New York, NY and Detroit, MI customer zones 
can be reassigned. The new assignments of this network are shown as dotted lines (Detroit 
demand is contingently assigned to the San Diego, CA facility while NY demand is partly 




Table 3.5 Operational costs under two different contingency operations 
Cases cLS cFlow 
Case I: Flow Re-allocation 73,555,000 12,037,000 
Case II: Contingent Rerouting 73,555,000 17,860,000 
 
Table 3.5 provides operational costs involving lost sales costs (cLS) and the 
transportation costs (cFlow) under the two cases of contingency operations illustrated through 
Figure 3.6b and Figure 3.6c. As can be observed in these results, contingency operation that 
relies on redesigned network through supply re-allocations is more cost effective than the 
operation that relies only on re-routing of disrupted flows. In this example, redesign through re-
allocation of flows yielded approximately 32 % more reduction in system operational costs than 
re-routing of disrupted flows only.  
 
Re-allocations allow flow exchanges which lead to a new optimal flow configuration 
under disruptions. For instance, in the network of Figure 3.6b, after attack of NY, a facility at 
Philadelphia, PA starts to partially serve demands of NY and therefore the PA facility no longer 
serves the demands of Detroit, MI which is now served by a facility at Chicago, IL. This 
exchange of flows will result in lower total network costs of transportation as compared to the 
contingent re-routing approach which allow only demands originally handled by NY facility to 
be re-routed. Note that such an exchange would be unnecessary when one ignores facility 
capacity limits (uncapacitated) since any amount of disrupted flows can then be contingently re-
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routed to the next nearest facility. Therefore, contingent rerouting, which is an appropriate 
recourse solution for an uncapacitated system, may not be appropriate for a capacitated system. 
Redesign of network flows through supply re-allocations is a more effective flow mechanism 
than contingent re-routing in capacitated systems.  
 
The effectiveness of such contingency operations can be further enhanced through 
capacity backup provisions. This is because more supply flows can be recovered through backup 
productions and contingent capacity adjustments. Since response speeds impact the available 
capacity during recovery, appropriate selection of response speeds are necessary in planning 
such contingency strategies. Under a limited budget of protection, the main trade-off of response 
speed is with capacity volumes. At slower speeds, transitions to the desired capacities are slower 
and disruption impacts are prolonged even though the costs of such response speeds are low. At 
higher speeds desired capacities can be achieved faster. This however raises protection costs.  
 
In the following sections we investigate optimal protection strategies for risk mitigation 
with respect to attack, protection budget and backup capacity features. Two types of networks 
with different initial capacity layouts are studied, the first network has identical distribution of 
initial capacities, while the second network is more generic with varying initial facility 
capacities. The network analyzed consists of 15 customers and 10 facilities for which the input 
parameters are derived as explained in Section 3.5.1. The two networks are equivalent in terms 
of the total system capacity, total demands and capacity slacks, hence the results are comparable.  
 
3.5.3 Protection of networks with identical facility capacities 
 
In identical capacity networks, losing any facility will result in the same units of capacity 
loss. The disruption risks of such networks can be considered to be more evenly distributed 
among facilities than similar networks with non-identical capacity. The two networks are 
therefore amenable to different protection strategies. Table 3.6 summarizes the optimal 
protection strategies for different levels of attacks and protection budgets (expressed in monetary 
units) for the network with identical capacity. Under the different combinations of protection 
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budget and attack levels, it displays the optimal sets of facilities protected with levels of 
protection (Zjl), facility sets that would be attacked as a consequence of this protection strategy 
(Sj), the units of lost sales (uLS), flow units (uFlow), total cost of lost sales (cLS), total flow costs 
(cFlow) and average flow distances/costs (đ).  
 
The total operational costs of this network under varying budget levels are plotted for 
different attack levels in Figure 3.7. The total operational costs tend to grow when attacker 
capability is raised. Under this network, the attacker chooses to attack facilities that raise 
transportation costs the most. This rule is specific to networks where every facility has the same 
amount of initial capacity and penalties per unit lost sales are uniform and independent of 
customer locations or their demand sizes. This is because total cost of lost sales will remain 
unaffected irrespective of which sets of facilities in the network are attacked as long as the 
number of attacks are the same. The attacker can thus maximize benefits by attacking facilities 
that raise transportation costs the most. Consequently, protection efforts are concentrated in 

























Zjl Sj uLS uFlow cLS cFlow đ 
B = 0 1 - 1 6472 107280 16,982,500 36,205,500 337 
 2 - 1,5 18392 95360 48,260,600 35,287,200 370 
 3 - 1,5,10 30312 83440 79,538,700 29,737,700 356 
 4 - 1,3,5,10 42232 71520 110,817,000 24,835,900 347 
B = 670 1 1(4) 5 3472 110280 9,110,530 35,302,100 320 
 2 1(4) 5,10 15392 98360 40,388,600 29,752,600 302 
 3 1(4) 3,5,10 27312 86440 71,666,700 24,850,800 287 
 4 1(4) 2,3,5,7 39232 74520 102,945,000 20,637,800 277 
B = 1340 1 1(4), 5(4) 10 1236 112516 3,243,260 29,343,400 261 
 2 1(4), 5(4) 3,10 12392 101360 32,516,600 25,545,400 252 
 3 1(4), 5(4) 2,3,7 24312 89440 63,794,700 21,332,400 239 
 4 1(4), 2(4) 3,5,8,10 36232 77520 95,072,800 18,633,200 240 
B = 2010 1 1(2), 5(4) 10 628 113124 1,647,870 25,034,500 221 
 2 1(2), 5(4) 3,10 9392 104360 24,644,600 25,548,400 245 
 3 1(2), 2(4), 5(4) 3,8,10 21312 92440 55,922,700 19,327,900 209 
 4 1(2), 2(4), 5(4) 3,6,7,10 33232 80520 87,200,800 15,809,400 196 
B = 2680 1 1(2), 5(2) 2 298 113454 78,1952 22,928,200 202 
 2 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 7,10 6392 107360 16,772,600 24,074,800 224 
 3 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 6,7,10 18312 95440 48,050,700 17,571,600 184 





Figure 3.7: Total operational costs for network with identical facility capacities 
.  
 
3.5.4 Protection of a network with non-identical facility capacities 
 
In networks with non-identical facility capacities, protection is managed through securing 
both high capacity facilities and facilities that are critical to minimizing average flow distances. 
Optimal protection strategies of the identical capacity network cannot therefore be substituted for 
protecting these networks. The optimal protection strategies for non-identical capacity network 
are analyzed with respect to different combinations of protection budget and attack levels and the 











































Zjl Sj uLS uFlow cLS cFlow đ 
B = 0 1 - 1 28952 84800 75,970,000 10,345,600 122 
 2 - 1,3 42952 70800 112,706,000 9,063,540 128 
 3 - 1,3,5 51352 62400 134,748,000 8,877,430 142 
 4 - 1,2,3,5 68552 45200 179,880,000 7,051,860 156 
B = 670 1 1(4) 2 8752 105000 22,965,200 19,282,600 184 
 2 1(4) 2,7 15952 97800 41,858,000 18,617,100 190 
 3 1(4) 2,6,7 23552 90200 61,800,400 16,103,600 179 
 4 1(4) 2,3,6,7 37552 76200 98,536,400 10,179,400 134 
B = 1340 1 1(4), 2(4) 3 2552 111200 6,696,450 16,507,100 148 
 2 1(4), 2(4) 3, 10 8552 105200 22,440,400 15,235,200 145 
 3 1(4), 2(4) 3, 5, 9 16952 96800 44,482,000 12,055,600 125 
 4 1(4), 2(4) 3, 4, 8, 9 26952 86800 70,722,000 9,332,140 108 
B = 2010 1 1(4), 2(4), 3(4) 4 248 113504 650,752 10,625,300 94 
 2 1(4), 2(4), 3(4) 4,6 3552 110200 9,320,450 14,643,800 133 
 3 1(4), 2(4), 10(4) 3,4,8 17152 96600 45,006,800 10,538,600 109 
 4 1(4), 2(4), 3(4) 4,6,8,9 17552 96200 46,056,400 12,017,000 125 
B = 2680 1 1(4), 2(2),3(4) 4 0 113752 0 10,622,800 93 
  2 1(4), 2(4),10(2) 3,4 6952 106800 18,242,000 12,085,600 113 
  3 1(4), 2(4),10(4),8(4) 3,4,9 13752 100000 36,085,200 11,235,500 112 





Figure 3.8:  Total operational costs for network with non-identical facility capacities 
 
 
The operational costs increase when attack levels are higher but decrease when the 
protection budget is raised. The total operational costs of this network is plotted against available 
protection budget and attack levels in Figure 3.8. Although the decreasing trend of operational 
cost is observed for raising protection, this result is less intuitive in the specific case involving 
two facility attacks.  The total operational costs seems to grow under protection involving a 
higher budget level (B = 2680) than with a lower budget level (B = 2010). This solution is 
however superior with respect to both average flow distances and lost sales than other solutions 
at this budget level, which results due to the selection of optimal strategy based on normalized 
total costs. This can be explained by looking at two competing feasible strategies obtained for 
this problem as follows: Consider two feasible protection strategies A and B with a budget level 
of B = 2680. Table 3.8 provides the total cost in absolute values obtained with a feasible strategy 


































total cost obtained by selecting this strategy is the minimum among all feasible strategies that 
can be obtained at this budget level. Strategy B, however, results in the minimum normalized 
total costs with respect to all the feasible protection strategies at this budget level, and hence is 
selected as an optimal strategy, even though its total cost in absolute values is higher than that 
obtained for strategy A. Note that normalization is done to uniformly scale the two cost 
components (between 0 and 1), and hence to avoid any dominance of one cost component 
(higher values) over the other when protection decisions are made.  
 
 
Table 3.8 Illustration of results of two competing strategies in a non-identical capacity 
network 
Strategy Zjl Sj cLS cFlow cTotal đ 
A 1(4)+2(4)+3(4)+6(4) 4, 8 5,500,000 15,500,000 21,000,000 139 
B 1(4)+2(4)+10(2) 3, 4 18,200,000 12,100,000 30,300,000 113 
 
 
It can further be observed from Table 3.8 that selecting strategy B reduces the average 
flow distances but increases lost sales units  (i.e., fewer demand units are satisfied in this strategy 
as compared to strategy A). This will increase the total cost of disruption (cTotal), since unit 
costs of lost sales are higher compared to unit flow costs. Nevertheless, by avoiding the 
dominance of the lost sales cost component, strategy B leads to a lower transportation (flow) 
costs for customers who are served. If the strategy selection were based on absolute total costs 
rather than normalized costs, the resulting solution would lead to higher costs of serving 
customers due to increased flow distances. Selecting strategies based on normalized costs 
reduces such tendencies.  
 
Comparing experimental results of the two networks, it can be observed that the total 
operational costs of identical capacity networks are lower than that of a network with non-
identical capacities under no budget of protection (B=0). These results suggests that identical 
capacity network is more cost effective to operate if protection budget is non-existent.  Raising 
the level of protection however, marginal reductions in operational costs for this network is 
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much lower than that can be achieved from such protections in a non-identical capacity network. 
This effect can be observed by comparing the graphs in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8. These results 
indicate protection strategies are dependent on network characteristic of initial facility layout. In 
distance based network designs, transportation costs can be lowered if high capacity facilities are 
located in densely populated areas and low capacity facilities in less populated areas. Such high 
capacity facilities are strong candidates for attacks, particularly if post disruption demand 
allocations significantly raise travel costs. Protection strategies of non-identical capacity 
networks seek for trade-off solutions that balance the loss of high capacity facility against the 
loss of travel distances.  
 
3.5.5 Centralized vs distributed backups  
 
An important issue in contingent capacity adjustments through capacity backups is 
whether such backup capacities should be confined to a fewer facilities (centralized) or 
distributed over many to enable cost effective contingency strategies. The observation made 
from the above results suggests that one of the determinants is the capability of the attacker or 
the size of the attacks (r). A more offensive attacker is able to strike more facilities causing 
larger capacity losses. Under this condition, it is important for the defense planner to fortify as 
many facilities as possible so that maximum amount of existing capacities are preserved. This is 
true especially when available backup capacity volumes for contingent capacity adjustments are 
low as compared to capacities that may be lost from attacks. Planning denfense against more 
capable attacker therefore necessitates spreading out protection budget over many facilities. This 
means contingent capacity adjustments are done at several facilities by utilizing low capacities 
and slower speeds rather than confining such adjustments to fewer facilities with high capacities 
and higher speeds.  
 
Under a less offensive attack, recovering capacities faster is a more important priority 
than recovering more units of capacities since less capacities are lost from attacks. Contingent 
capacity adjustments can be done by utilizing higher response speeds and capacities of backups 
which centralizes backup over few facilities. These inferences can be drawn from the above 
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results. For instance,  when r = 1, 2, and under a budget level of B = 2680, Table 3.7 results 
show that, an optimal protection plan involves adding backups at three facilities; whereas when 
attacker capability is increased further (r = 3, 4) , it is necessary to spread backups to four 
facilities.  
 
The decision to centralize or distribute backup is also influenced by the available sizes 
(volumes) of backup capacities. If the range of available sizes differ widely, recovery through 
high volume and high response speed become more efficient, which result in centralized 
backups. This is illustrated in the following example. Consider protection in an identical facility 
capacity network under a protection budget of  B = 2680 and attack of two facilities (r = 2). The 
identical capacity network is chosen for this illustration to avoid any influence on the results due 
to initial capacity variations. Table 3.9 shows the results of optimal protection under two 
different settings of available backup capacity for this problem. Under the first setting the range 
of available volumes is small (high volume =2000 units, low volume=1000 units). The optimal 
protection plan obtained under this backup capacity availability involves protecting four facilities 
at low capacity and response speeds, i.e. distributed backup.  
 
 
Table 3.9 Effect of varying backup capacity sizes on optimal protection 
 
Backup 
capacity sizes Zjl Sj uLS uFlow cLS cFlow đ 
H: 2000 units 
L: 1000 units 1(4), 2(4), 3(4), 5(4) 7,10 6392 107360 16,772,600 24,074,800 224 
H: 2500 units 
L: 500 units 1(1), 5(4) 2,7 8142 105610 21,364,600 25,497,000 241 
 
 
Under the second setting the range of available volumes is increased (high volume 
=2500, low volume=500). As a result of this variation, the optimal protection changes from a 
distributed backup plan of the initial setting to a centralized one in which only two facilities are 
protected by utilizing higher volumes and higher available response speeds.  
 60 
 
The above results have demonstrated that decisions to centralize or distribute backups are 
dependent on how the network capacities are affected due to attacks as well as what capacity 
sizes are available for contingent adjustments. When planning defense under more offensive 
attacks, it is generally preferable to distribute the available backup, unless the low volume and 
speeds of contingent capacity adjustment through such plans outweigh the benefits gained from 
securing more units of existing capacities. 
 
3.5.6 Algorithm performance 
 
Computational performance and robustness of the proposed algorithm is evaluated under 
larger networks. The number of customer zones (demands) and facilities were varied to study the 
effect of these variations on algorithm performance. The experiments were conducted for all 
combination of five level of attacks  (r = 1 to 5) , four levels of budget  (B=670, 1340, 2010, 
2680), three levels of demands (I=25, 35, 50) and three levels of facility (J=10,15,20). The 
demands, distance and facility capacities were derived as explained in Section 5.1 and are 
provided in Appendix. All of the experiments were conducted under identical settings. The 
computational results are summarized in Table 3.10. All problem instances provided in this 
Table could be solved to optimality in a reasonable amount of computational time.  
 
Increasing the size of the number of facilities (J) and the number of demands (I) both 
increase the size of the ULP problem to be solved at each iteration because it increases the 
number of variables and constraints of the problem. The depth and the breadth of the binary 
search tree is independent of these parameters but increases with the increase of attack level r 










Table 3.10 Computational performance of the algorithm on larger networks 
Budget Problem  instance 
Sj  Zjl  Total  Cost( x10
6 )  CPU time(s) 
I=25 I=35 I=50  I=25 I=35 I=50  I=25 I=35 I=50  I=25 I=35 I=50 
                 B=670 10.1 2 2 2 
 
1(4) 1(4) 1(4) 
 
24.00 38.20 73.96 
 
0.10 0.20 0.30 
 
10.2 2,7 2,7 2,7 
 
1(4) 1(4) 5(4) 
 
41.10 66.20 111.28 
 
0.20 0.25 0.3 
 
10.3 2,3,4 1,3,10 2,6,7 
 
1(4) 5(4) 1(4) 
 
43.80 145.40 147.71 
 
0.25 0.35 1 
 
10.4 2,4,6,7 1,2,3,7 2,3,6,7 
 
1(4) 5(4) 1(4) 
 
90.20 129.77 196.59 
 
1 1 2 
 
10.5 1,4,6,7,9 1,2,3,7,10 2,3,6,7,10 
 
1(4) 5(4) 1(4) 
 
115.00 235.70 229.92 
 
1 1 2 
 
15.1 2 2 2 
 
1(4) 1(4) 1(4) 
 
10.80 22.20 52.20 
 
0.15 0.25 0.35 
 
15.2 2,7 2,3 2,7 
 
1(4) 1(4) 5(4) 
 
20.50 29.66 79.80 
 
0.25 0.3 1 
 
15.3 2,6,7 1,3,10 2,6,7 
 
1(4) 5(4) 5(4) 
 
34.80 111.40 107.90 
 
1 3 4 
 
15.4 2,3,4,6 1,3,10,12 2,7,11,13 
 
1(4) 5(4) 5(4) 
 
38.20 133.00 124.80 
 
6 11 14 
 
15.5 2,3,4,6,7 1,3,10,12,15 2,6,7,11,13 
 
1(4) 5(4) 5(4) 
 
66.20 154.20 153.20 
 
17 24 33 
 
20.1 2 2 1 
 
1(4) 1(4) 2(4) 
 
13.40 29.60 84.90 
 
0.3 0.35 0.4 
 
20.2 2,7 1,3 2,11 
 
1(4) 2(4) 7(4) 
 
24.50 46.28 73.50 
 
0.35 1 2 
 
20.3 2,6,7 2,3,4 7,11,13 
 
1(4) 1(4) 2(4) 
 
36.90 54.90 63.30 
 
5 9 15 
 
20.4 1,2,3,7 1,3,5,18 6,7,11,13 
 
5(4) 2(4) 2(4) 
 
82.50 110.30 84.60 
 
29 47 69 
 
20.5 1,2,3,6,7 2,6,11,13,16 2,6,11,13,16 
 
5(4) 7(4) 7(4) 
 
104.20 79.20 123.50 
 
112 171 234 
                 B=1340 10.1 3 3 3 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
21.80 28.20 53.15 
 
0.2 0.3 0.5 
 
10.2 3,10 3,4 3,10 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
29.40 37.71 86.48 
 
0.25 0.35 1 
 
10.3 2,3,4 2,4,6 3,4,8 
 
1(4),5(4) 1(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
40.20 83.30 129.04 
 
1 2 3 
 
10.4 2,4,7,9 2,4,6,9 3,4,8,9 
 
1(4),6(4) 1(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
71.30 115.00 166.14 
 
3 4 5 
 
10.5 2,4,7,8,9 2,4,6,8,9 3,4,8,9,10 
 
1(4),6(4) 1(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
102.70 151.60 199.47 
 
3 4 5 
 
15.1 3 4 3 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
10.30 17.10 32.40 
 
0.3 0.35 0.6 
 
15.2 4,9 4,9 3,4 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
17.20 26.80 65.20 
 
0.4 1 3 
 
15.3 4,8,9 3,4,5 2,11,13 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),7(4) 
 
26.20 40.61 89.60 
 
6 10 18 
 
15.4 2,3,4,5 3,4,8,9 3,4,8,9 
 
1(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
25.98 64.90 118.80 
 
26 45 64 
 
15.5 3,4,5,8,9 3,4,5,8,9 3,4,8,9,12 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 
 
46.78 90.80 140.90 
 
71 110 163 
 
20.1 6 6 1 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 2(3) 
 
6.76 13.60 83.90 
 
0.3 0.35 0.45 
 
20.2 4,9 6,7 6,7 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 2(4),11(4) 
 
10.10 20.80 42.40 
 
2 3 7 
 
20.3 4,8,9 3,4,5 6,7,13 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 2(4),11(4) 
 
16.40 17.19 58.00 
 
20 32 52 
 
20.4 4,8,9,16 3,4,6,7 2,6,13,16 
 
1(4),2(4) 1(4),2(4) 7(4), 11(4) 
 
22.70 43.30 96.90 
 
124 195 270 
 
20.5 2,3,4,5,6 3,4,6,8,9 2,4,8,11,13 
 
1(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4) 6(4),7(4) 
 
34.10 61.40 122.40 
 
540 753 1095 
                 B=2010 10.1 6 6 7 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4) 
 
15.60 22.90 40.73 
 
0.3 0.4 0.5 
 
10.2 6,7 3,4 3,4 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),5(4) 1(4),2(4),10(4) 
 
21.00 34.08 83.83 
 
1 2 3 
 
10.3 2,4,5 3,4,5 3,4,8 
 
1(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),10(4) 1(3),2(4) 
 
24.87 64.10 128.02 
 
4 7 8 
 
10.4 4,6,8,9 4,6,8,9 3,4,8,9 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),10(4) 
 
42.17 85.10 158.64 
 
8 15 17 
 
10.5 2,3,5,6,10 3,5,8,9,10 3,5,6,7,10 
 
1(4),4(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),8(4) 
 
99.50 123.00 186.64 
 
9 13 17 
 
15.1 6 3 4 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4) 
 
9.10 15.90 26.78 
 
0.35 0.45 0.6 
 
15.2 3,12 3,5 3,5 
 
1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 
 
14.70 21.30 53.60 
 
2 4 10 
 
15.3 3,10,12 3,5,6 3,5,10 
 
1(4),2(4),8(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 
 
20.20 25.58 77.20 
 
20 43 65 
 
15.4 2,3,5,6 3,4,5,10 3,4,5,9 
 
1(4),4(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),9(4) 1(4),2(4),8(4) 
 
22.87 57.60 111.70 
 
91 150 247 
 
15.5 3,5,6,8,9 3,6,7,8,9 3,4,9,10,12 
 
1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4) 1(4),2(4),8(4) 
 
28.30 68.30 129.30 
 
297 461 743 
 
20.1 3 4 3 
 
1(4),2(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),6(4) 1(4),2(2) 
 
6.57 12.20 25.15 
 
0.4 0.45 1 
 
20.2 3,19 4,9 3,4 
 
1(4),2(4),9(4) 1(4),2(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),7(4) 
 
9.48 18.20 46.70 
 
6 10 24 
 
20.3 7,11,13 4,8,9 3,4,8 
 
1(4),2(4),9(4) 1(4),2(2) 1(4),2(2) 
 
13.30 26.40 68.50 
 
76 106 195 
 
20.4 6,7,11,13 3,5,6,7 3,4,8,9 
 
1(4),2(4),9(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),6(4) 
 
21.50 26.01 88.70 
 
612 893 1073 
 
20.5 2,3,4,5,9 3,4,6,7,9 4,7,8,9,11 
 
1(4),6(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),8(4) 1(4),2(4),6(4) 
 
21.89 54.40 94.30 
 
2245 3509 4367 
                 B=2680 10.1 10 7 4 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1 (4), 2 (3), 3 (3) 
 
15.00 21.40 34.57 
 
0.4 0.5 0.65 
 
10.2 4,9 4,8 3,4 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),10(2) 
 
20.70 31.10 76.60 
 
2 5 7 
 
10.3 6,7,8 5,6,7 4,6,7 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 3(4),1(4),2(4),8(4) 
 
22.90 38.36 98.30 
 
24 20 25 
 
10.4 5,6,7,8 3,5,6,7 3,4,6,9 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),10(4) 1(4),2(4), 8(4),10(4) 
 
24.46 82.00 149.00 
 
28 33 42 
 
10.5 5,6,7,8,9 5,6,7,8,9 5,6,7,8,9 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 
 
41.10 92.60 156.64 
 
29 33 45 
 
15.1 4 6 6 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 
 
8.95 15.30 23.70 
 
0.45 0.55 0.65 
 
15.2 8,9 8,9 3,5 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(2),2(4), 4(4) 
 
11.60 20.30 45.90 
 
7 11 25 
 
15.3 6,8,9 3,5,7 3,5,10 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),6(4) 1(3),2(4),4(4) 
 
14.70 21.70 75.90 
 
75 119 246 
 
15.4 2,3,5,8 6,7,8,9 4,6,7,9 
 
1(4),4(4),6(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),8(4) 
 
18.31 33.72 88.90 
 
350 510 1091 
 
15.5 3,5,6,7,8 4,5,6,8,9 3,5,8,9,10 
 
1(2),2(4),4(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),12(4) 
 
18.36 60.30 119.20 
 
1042 1747 3130 
 
20.1 14 4 7 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),6(2) 2(4),1(4),3(4),6(4) 
 
6.33 11.70 24.00 
 
0.5 0.65 0.7 
 
20.2 6,7 7,11 3,4 
 
1(4),2(4),3(4),9(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),6(4) 2(4),13(4), 6(4), 1(4) 
 
8.86 16.10 39.90 
 
16 26 55 
 
20.3 3,12,19 6,7,13 3,6,7 
 
1(3),2(3),4(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),11(4) 1(4),2(2),4(4) 
 
13.20 24.10 57.40 
 
196 339 568 
 
20.4 3,10,12,19 3,5,7,8 3,4,8,9 
 
1(4),2(4),6(4),8(4) 1(4),2(4),4(4),6(4) 2(4),6(2),1(4) 
 
17.10 17.25 82.50 
 
2166 4131 4311 
 
20.5 2,3,5,8,9 4,5,7,8,9 3,4,8,9,16 
 
1(4),4(4),6(4),7(4) 1(4),2(4),3(4),6(4) 1(4),2(4),19(4),6(4) 
 
15.29 31.66 98.40 
 




3.5.6.1 Effect of raising budget levels (B) on computational time under different network sizes 
 
The average CPU time under varying levels of protection budget with respect to demand 
sizes (I) and number of facilities (J) are shown in Table 3.11a and Table 3.11b respectively. The 
average CPU times are computed from the results shown in Table 3.10. The values in Table 
3.11a represents the mean computational time across all attack levels and facility levels for each 
settings of budget level and demand level. The values of Table 3.11b is the mean computational 
time across all attack levels and all demand levels for each setting of budget level and facility 
level.   As expected, the CPU times increase when budget levels are increased. This is because 
more number of facilities can be protected at higher budgets which will increase the depth of the 
search tree and consequently the number of nodes at which the ULP needs to be solved. 
Comparing the values across the two tables, shows that changing the number of facilities has 
more influence on computational effort than changing the number of demand. For the same level 
of protection, it is observed in these results that a network with 20 facilities raises the average 
CPU time by almost seven folds than the network with 15 facilities. Although changing the 








(a) Number of Demand Zones (b) Number of Facilities 
I=25 I=35 I=50 J=10 J=15 J=20 
B=670 11 18 25 1 8 46 
B=1340 53 77 112 2 34 206 
B=2010 225 348 451 7 142 874 






3.5.6.2 Effect of raising attack levels (r) on computational time under different network sizes 
 
The variations in average CPU time with respect to the number of attacks and the demand 
levels is depicted in Table 3.12a. The averages are obtained from Table 3.10 by computing the 
mean CPU time across all levels of budget and number of facilities. The results show that the 
computational effort is increased when attack levels are raised. At lower level of attacks, 
computations are quite fast irrespective of the demand levels.   
 
 




(a) Number of Demand Zones (b) Number of Facilities 
I=25 I=35 I=50 J=10 J=15 J=20 
r=1 0.31 0.40 0.56 0.36 0.42 0.49 
r=2 3.12 5.33 11.53 1.86 5.41 12.70 
r=3 35.69 57.53 100.00 7.97 50.83 134.42 
r=4 287.00 502.92 600.42 13.25 217.08 1160.00 
r=5 1076.33 1947.25 2255.08 13.50 653.17 4612.00 
 
 
Table 3.12b demonstrates the effect of varying attack levels when the average CPU time 
is computed across all demand levels and budget levels. Comparing results in Table 3.12a and 
3.12b, it can be seen that neither the increase in number of facilities nor the number of demands 
significantly affect the solution times if the attack levels are low. When attack levels increase, 
solution times increase. Higher facility levels are quite dominant in raising computational effort 
of the algorithm than raising the demand levels. This is similar to observation made in Section 







3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
In this Chapter, we examined the problem of responsive contingency planning under a 
major disruption from intentional attack on supply facilities. The tri-level game theoretic model 
was developed in which facility security and disruption recovery aspects were integrated. The 
contingent mechanism to enhance recovery was considered through backup production, the 
appropriate volume and response speeds for which were involved as model decisions. We further 
developed implicit enumeration algorithm utilizing the structure of the problem which enabled 
solving the proposed model for developing protection strategies for risk mitigation. Through a 
small illustrative example involving single facility attack, we first demonstrated the demand 
routing characteristic optimal under a capacitated system. In particular, the importance of flow 
re-allocations rather than contingent re-routing in a capacitated network was demonstrated. As 
well, it was shown that instantaneous capacity addition assumptions leads to capacity 
overestimations and inappropriate mitigation solutions and inadequate recourse actions during 
major disruptions.  
 
We presented two hypothetical networks with different initial capacity distributions to 
demonstrate that network topologies affect its vulnerability to disruptions and contingency 
strategies of protection can be different under varying network configurations. It was 
demonstrated that identical capacity distributions have risk diversification effect, and are 
effective for controlling losses under a major disruptions. However, the relative efficiency 
improvements through protection are lower for such networks than networks with non-identical 
capacity distributions in its facilities. Through this analysis, we also observed that planning 
against a more capable adversary (higher number of attacks), protection needs to be dispersed or 
decentralized in order to spread out risk.  
 
We further examined the computational performance of the developed algorithm with 
respect to the variations in the budget of protection, number of attacks, number of facilities and 
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number of demands. It is observed that computational time increase with the increase of budget 
level, attack levels, number of facilities or the number of demands. Raising the protection budget 
or the attack level lead to increase in the size of the search tree which affect the computational 
time. As well, increasing number of facilities and the number of demands both raise computation 
time but the effect of raising the number of facilities is higher than the effect of raising the 
number of demands. The solution time for problem size involving up to fifty demands, twenty 
facilities, four levels of protection budget and five levels of attacks have been reported. Since 
protection budget are normally tight and simultaneous attacks on multiple facilities are limited to 
a few facilities, the test problem sizes are practical. The optimal solution with the largest values 
for each parameter (I = 50, J = 20, r =5 and B=2680) was obtained in less than 5 hours of CPU 










The level of responsiveness of a backup supplier is one of the important considerations in a 
contingency strategy relying on backup sourcing. The supply network may incur significant short 
term losses through lost sales if backup production is not adequately responsive to fill customer 
demands. In the long term, the incurred losses may result in losing market share to the 
competitors.  However, despite the responsiveness of a backup supplier, rerouting the affected 
demand at the beginning of the response period will create an overflow when the backup 
capacity is not fully available. As a result of this overflow, the congestion effects build up which 
would increase lead time and lower throughput during the response period.  
 
Congestion in the system is a general consequence of a mismatch between demand arrival 
rates and production rates at facilities. Contingency strategies relying on backup production 
should consider this effect in order to get a better representation of the available system capacity 
during disruption periods. This will enable proper identification of appropriate levels of response 
speed and production volumes at backup facilities necessary for optimal protection design and 
flow recovery.  
 
The literature deals with congestion effects through its implicit modeling using queueing 
systems and capacity constraints or through explicit modeling by including it in the objective 
function of an optimization model. In the implicit approach, congestion effects are incorporated 
by introducing expected queue lengths (WIP) or waiting times derived using queueing models as 
constraints. This approach is taken in most capacity planning and strategic design models 
involving facility location decisions. In capacity planning, Bitran and Tirupati (1989) introduced 
congestion effects for the first time by developing a model to minimize total capacity costs in 
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which WIP level was computed using GI/G/m queueing system and a capacity constraint was 
imposed to limit it to a target level. Marianov and Serra (2003) apply this approach in a hub and 
spoke network topology where the hubs are modeled as M/D/c queueing system and congestion 
is captured using a probabilistic capacity constraint that limits the queue length at hub facilities.  
 
Congestion effects are modeled with explicit incorporation of congestion related costs in 
the objective function of the optimization models in many articles. Amiri (1997) considered a 
service facility location problem in which service facilities are modeled as M/M/1 queue. The 
model incorporates the cost of waiting time in the objective function of a cost minimization 
problem which include transportation costs and fixed costs of facility location. Wang, Batta and 
Rump (2002) also model service facilities as M/M/1 queueing system in the immobile server 
facility location problem but they additionally include a constraint which bounds the waiting 
time at each facility to a desired limit. This model therefore allows a better control of congestion 
than in Amiri (1997). The M/M/1 queue is also applied in Zhang, Berman and Verter (2009) to 
deal with congestion effects in preventive healthcare facilities. Vidyarthi and Kuzgunkaya (2015) 
study similar problem using a more general M/G/1 queues in order to deal with situations with 
different coefficient of variations in service times. Clearing function is utilized to model 
congestion effects on available capacity (throughput) in a few articles. Clearing function is 
introduced by Karmarkar (1989) and provide throughputs as a function of WIP and the service 
rates at facilities. Kim (2012) utilizes this function to estimate the capacity levels of facilities 
under congestion. The WIP is computed by considering facilities as a GI/G/1 queueing models. 
The model involves a facility location problem which simultaneously minimizes congestion cost 
(the order waiting cost due to congestion), the fixed costs and the transportation costs. Nejad et 
al. (2014) also utilize clearing function to model congestion in a responsive contingency 
planning problem involving backup supplier. The WIP for the clearing function is derived using 
a M/G/1 queueing system. The appropriate level of capacity of a backup supplier is estimated 
using this clearing function.  
 
The application of queueing models facilitate congestion effect analysis under demand 
variability and stochastic processing times. When this is not the case, congestion effects can be 
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handled using appropriate other functions that model flows to the facilities. Elhedhli and Hu 
(2005) explicitly model congestion costs on the objective function using a convex cost function 
that increases exponentially as more flows are routed to facilities (hubs). Camargo, Miranda, 
Ferreira and Luna (2009) also propose a generalized convex cost function to model congestion 
under a deterministic demand at the hubs.  In a closely related article involving competitive 
facility location in a distribution netwrok, Konur and Geunes (2011, 2012) also introduce convex 
cost functions in the objective function of their model to capture traffic congestion cost on the 
distribution network link.  
 
Most of the relevant articles consider handling congestion under a common problem of 
matching supply with demand, despite the different approaches in modeling. With the exception 
of Nejad et al. (2014) none of the aforementioned articles focus on the management of major 
disruptions. In this Chapter we focus on the management of major disruption risks under 
congestion effects. In particular, we investigate the congestion impacts on responsive 
contingency planning under the risk of a major supply disruption. The remainder of the Chapter 
is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the congestion cost function utilized in this work, 
its linearization technique and the re-formulation of the tri-level model and its solution. Section 
4.3 presents results and analysis. Chapter summary is presented in Section 4.4.  
 
4.2 Congestion integrated responsive contingency planning model  
 
The responsive contingency planning model under congestion applies the same 
framework as the model presented in Chapter 3. The overall problem is presented in a game 
theoretic defender-attacker-defender principle but in this case, the recourse plan involves 
consideration of congestion related costs. In other words, within the D-A-D framework 
developed in Chapter 3, in the model presented here, the user level problem is solved with an 
additional cost term related to congestion in the objective function. We first present the 




4.2.1 Congestion cost function  
 
Congestion affects supply flows of a facility, the cause and effect of which can be 
represented as shown in Figure 4.1. When more flows are directed to a facility, congestion levels 
grow, whereas increased congestion leads to reduced throughput. Therefore as more flows are 
directed to a facility, the congestion costs tend to grow. This relationship can be represented 
using a convex cost function as provided in (4.1): 
 
 ( ) qf wφ φ=  (4.1) 
 
where φ  is the amount of flow to a facility and w and q  are positive constants with q ≥  1.  
 
The congestion cost function (4.1) does not consider the capacity limit on facilities, 
however it implies that congestion costs increase in flow volume at an increasing rate and 
reflects the nature of facility congestion in supply systems. Similar function is applied in Konur 
and Geunes (2011, 2012) to represent traffic congestion in a distribution network design of a 
competitive supply chain. Elhedhli and Hu (2005) also apply this kind of function for computing 
congestion costs in a hub location problem. The rationale of using such convex cost functions is 
consistent with the study of Weisbrod, Vary and Treyz (2001) which investigates the sensitivity 
of congestion by industry sectors. Their study mentions that higher level of congestion are 













Using the notations in Table 3.1, the total flow directed to a facility j at each time period t 






= ∑   (4.2) 
 
 
Using relations (4.1) and (4.2) the congestion cost function for every facility j at each time period 
t can therefore be expressed as: 
  
 ( )( ) qqjt jt ijt
i I
f w w xφ φ
∈
= = ∑   (4.3) 
 
This function (4.3) is non-linear and convex. The linear approximation of congestion cost 
function ( )jtf φ   near a given flow  kjtφ  is obtained from the equation of the tangent line:  
 
 ( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )( ) (1 ) q qk k k k kjt jt jt jt jt jt jtf f w q wqφ φ φ φ φ φ φ
−
′+ − = − +   (4.4) 
The linear approximation of the congestion cost function ( )jtf φ  corresponds to the maximum of 
a set of piecewise linear and tangent hyperplanes.  
   




jt ijt ijt ijtk K i i i
f w q x wq x xφ
−
∈
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  (4.5) 
Here kϵKj represents the infinite sets of points where tangent line equations can be written for 





4.2.2 Model formulation  
 
Using the same set of notations as in Section 3.3, we formulate the tri-level responsive 
contingency planning model under congestion. In this model structure, the user level problem 
corresponds to decisions where the system user (defender) chooses allocations for each demand 
facility pair and the corresponding lost sales units to solve the underlying cost minimization 
problem. The attacker level corresponds to the worst case attack where the attacker selects an 
attack scenario s from a feasible attack scenario set S to maximize costs, while the defender level 
problem involves defender’s choice of a protection solution z from a feasible solution set Z to 
minimize the costs. The model therefore seeks an optimal protection z ϵ Z by solving the nested 
optimization problem (4.6)  
 
, ,
min max min ( , , , )
z Z x u X Us S
Costs z s x u
∈ ∈∈
  (4.6) 
 
This nested structure is similar to the problem formulated in Chapter 3, except the 
additional cost term introduced due to congestion which affects the user level problem. The 
defender level and the attacker level problems are therefore structurally similar and identical to 
the formulations of a responsive contingency planning model developed in Section 3.3. We 
rewrite here the formulations of these two levels and develop a modified formulation for the user 
level problem.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 Defender level problem 
 
This layer of problem is concerned with optimal utilization of available budget to secure 
facilities and determine the level of responsiveness and volume of backup production. The model 




   ( )min  
z
H z   (4.7) 
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 jl jl
j J l L
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≤∑   j J∀ ∈  (4.9) 
 { }  0 ,  1jlz ∈   ,j J l L∀ ∈ ∈  (4.10)  
 
The defender objective function (4.7) minimizes the maximum network costs due to 
attacks by selecting facilities to protect with production backups. Constraint (4.8) mentions that 
protection budget cannot be exceeded. Constraint (4.9) ensures that every facility is protected 
with only one level of protection. Constraint (4.10) sets a binary restriction on protection 
variable.  
 
4.2.2.2 Attacker level problem 
 
The assumption made at this level is that the attacker knows the congestion related costs 
that the network may suffer under an optimal contingency strategy following attacks. Since the 
congestion costs are accounted at the user level, the attacker problem under congestion is 
structurally similar to the problem developed in Section 3.3. It involves attacker’s objective of 
creating maximum network operation costs through the selection of optimal attack scenario s, 
given the protection decisions z of the defender. The model is written as follows: 
 
 
            ( ) ( ) max ,
s











+ ≤∑   j J∀ ∈  (4.13) 
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 { }  0 ,  1 js ∈   j J∀ ∈  (4.14)  
    
Objective function (4.11) maximizes the network operation cost for the system user. 
Constraint (4.12) represents that attacker has capability of attacking only a finite number (r) of 
facilities. Constraint (4.13) prohibits attacks of protected facilities. Constraint (4.14) imposes 
binary restriction on the attack variable.  
 
4.2.2.3 User level problem  
 
The user level problem allocates demands to facilities in order to minimize the total costs 
of network operation, given the attack and protection solutions. The total costs include the 
transportation costs, the lost sales costs and the congestion costs. The model can be written as 
follows: 
            
, 1 1 1
( , ) min
qT T T
ij ijt i it ijtx u i I j J t i I t j J t i I
G s z d x u w xβ
∈ ∈ = ∈ = ∈ = ∈
  
= + +     






+ =∑   , 1...i I t T∀ ∈ =  (4.16) 
( )1ijt j jt tl jl jl
i I l L
x s v m a z
∈ ∈
 
≤ − + 
 
∑ ∑   , 1...j J t T∀ ∈ =  (4.17) 
0ijtx ≥   , , 1...i I j J t T∀ ∈ ∈ =  (4.18) 
0itu ≥   , 1...i I t T∀ ∈ =  (4.19) 
 
Objective function (4.15) minimizes the transportation costs, lost sales costs and the 
congestion costs of network operation given the protected and attacked facilities of the network. 










∑∑ ∑ ,   which is a convex and non-
linear function, which is further explained in Section 4.2. Constraint (4.16) ensures that unmet 
demands are accounted as lost sales so that lost sales penalty can be applied. Constraint (4.17) 
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ensures that the flows (allocated units) are no higher than the facility capacity including the base 
capacity and the backup production if that facility is protected.  It also ensures that there is no 
allocation to an attacked facility. Constraint (4.18) and (4.19) are non-negativity constraints for 
allocation and lost sales decisions.  
 
The compact version of the overall tri-level protection design model with congestion can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
 ( ), 1 1 1min max min
qT T T
ij ijt i it ijtz x us i I j J t i I t j J t i I
d x u w xβ
∈ ∈ = ∈ = ∈ = ∈
  + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
  
  (4.20) 
 s.t. (4.8)-(4.10), (4.12)-(4.14), (4.16)-(4.19) 
 
As the congestion cost term (third term) expressed in (4.20) is non-linear, it is substituted 
with a linear approximation function presented in Section 4.2. Using the linearized congestion 
cost function (4.5), the tri level model (4.20) is written as: 
 
1
, 1 1 1
min max min max (1 )
q qT T T
k k
ij ijt i it ijt ijt ijtz x us ki I j J t i I t j J t i i i
d x u w q x wq x xβ
−
∈ ∈ = ∈ = ∈ =
          + + − +                 
∑∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
  (4.21) 
 s.t. (4.8)-(4.10), (4.12)-(4.14), (4.16)-(4.19) 
   
  
 Replacing the congestion term in (4.21) with 
jtη  and adding constraint (4.23), the tri-
level model (4.21) is equivalent to: 
 
 
, 1 1 1
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i i i
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−
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We further note that it is necessary to ensure high costs of congestion do not cause the 
system to incur lost sales at the expense of unutilized capacity (in order to reduce total network 
costs). To this end, the constraint (4.24) is introduced in the user level problem to bound lost 
sales .Constraint (4.24) implies an upper bound of zero for lost sale units if total system capacity 
is higher than total demands and a positive difference if total demands are higher than total 
system capacity. 
 
 ( )max 0, 1it it j jt tl jl jl
i I i I j J l
u h s v m a z
∈ ∈ ∈
  
≤ − − +  
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∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (4.24) 
 
A big M variable and a binary variable 
ty   are introduced to linearize (4.24) with the 
following three constraints:  
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 Adding these sets of constraints, the complete tri-level game theoretic responsive 
contingency planning model (MILP) under congestion can therefore be expressed as follows: 
 
 [TLM]: 
, 1 1 1
min max min
T T T
ij ijt i it jtz x us i I j J t i I t j J t
d x u wβ η
∈ ∈ = ∈ = ∈ =
  
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4.2.3 Solution Methodology 
 
Implicit enumeration algorithm is applied on a binary search tree to solve the tri-level 
responsive contingency planning model under congestion effects [TLM].  The algorithm is 
similar to the one developed in Chapter 3, but we remove the cost normalization procedure, so 
that the impacts of congestion on protection decisions and its trade-off with the other costs can 
be better understood, as this is the main objective in  this part of the dissertation.  
 
With these changes, the enumeration tree corresponding to an illustrative problem 
involving five facilities located in five states in the US (NY, CA, IL, TX and PA) and two facility 
attacks (r = 2) is depicted in Figure 4.2. Every node of this enumeration tree is now characterized 
by a) total network cost (cTot) involving the sum of transportation cost, lost sales cost and the 
congestion cost b) attacked facilities (S) , which are the candidate facilities for protection in the 
next stage and c) the remaining budget of protection (Brem). Note that in this part of the problem, 
the attacker’s objective is to maximize the total costs as opposed to the normalized total costs 
which we considered in Chapter 3. The search tree progression, branching, pruning and 
fathoming of nodes are however, similar to the one discussed in Section 3.4, so its detailed 




Figure 4.2: Congestion model solution binary search tree illustration 
 
 
Considering two levels of capacity (high, low) and two levels of response speed (high, 
low) generates four different levels (l) of facility protection with backup production capability. In 
this example we assign ten units of budget (arbitrary) for protection and each level of protection 
consumes the budget as follows: level 1=10 units; level 2= 8 units; level 3= 6 units; level 4= 5 
units. Under given budget and the costs of protection, this enumeration tree results in nine leaf 
nodes at its termination ( A, B, C, E, F, G, L, P and T), each with a unique values of S and cTot 
obtained as solutions to the attacker problem. Backtracking from the leaf node with least total 
network cost, i.e. node L (with a cTot=100), we obtain optimal protection solution as securing 
both IL and CA with backup production at level 4, i.e., we select low volume capacity and low 
response speeds for backup production by securing these two facilities. Consequently, the 
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attacker will interdict facilities NY and PA inorder to create the maximum possible cost to the 
system operator under this protection scenario.  
 
4.3 Results and Analysis 
 
In this section, computational results and managerial insights are presented. In this part of 
the dissertation, the experiments were solved using ILOG CPLEX 12.6 solver implemented 
using Java and Concert Technology on a Dell Latitude E5430 station with an Intel Core i5-3340 
M processor at 2.7 GHz and 8 GB of RAM running Windows 7 operating system.  The demands 
and distances data are derived from the US Census Bureau 2000 dataset (Daskin, 2004). The 
backup capacity volumes and response speeds and capacity addition costs are computed in a 
similar way as in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. Facility base capacities are assumed identical and its 
computation also follows discussions on Section 3.5. The data are presented in Appendix A.  
 
An illustrative example is presented using 15 demand nodes (i=15) and 10 facilities 
(j=10). The 10 facilities and the 15 demand nodes network used for this illustrative example is 
graphically represented in Figure 4.3 (small circles represent demand nodes and larger circles 
represent facilities; concentric circles represent the existence of both demands and facility at the 
same location). This network is constructed by ranking demand nodes by population size and 
opening of ten (j=10) facilities in the top ten demand zones. The network is utilized to 
demonstrate the flow allocation characteristic under congestion effects and highlight the 
significance of considering congestion in protection designs for disruption risk mitigations. We 
further investigate the trade-off between the congestion cost and other operational costs and 
analyze network performance under varying levels of attacks and congestion severity. The 






Figure 4.3:  Demand and facility locations considered for congestion model analysis  
 
 
4.3.1 Characteristic of supply flow allocations under congestion  
 
The more demands are shifted to a facility, the higher is its congestion level. The 
allocations that are more balanced across facilities tend to lower costs of congestion. The supply 
flow allocation under congestion effect is demonstrated in Table 4.1. This Table lists the total 
flows allocated to facilities under both the traditional model which ignores congestion related 
costs and the model which incorporates congestion costs. The traditional model is based on the 
minimization of lost sales costs and the transportation costs in the ULP problem and ignores the 
impacts of congestion. The results are compared for varying congestion profiles i) low (w= 0.1, 
q=1.1) ii) medium (w=1, q=1.5) and iii) high (w=10, q=2.0), subject to a given budget (B=2680 






Table 4.1 Supply flow allocations of traditional and congestion model 











1.New York, NY  20652 20652 20652 12780 
2.Los Angeles, CA 0 0 0 0 
3.Chicago, IL 13652 13652 13652 12660 
4.Houston, TX  10766 10766 10766 12540 
5.Philadelphia,PA  16652 16652 16652 12780 
6.Phoenix, AZ  13652 13652 13652 12660 
7.San Diego, CA  13652 13652 13652 12660 
8.Dallas, TX  8195 8195 7890 12540 
9.San Antonio TX  6984 6984 7289 12472 
10.Detroit, MI 9547 9547 9547 12660 
 
 
Table 4.2 Comparison of solutions of traditional and congestion model 
 Traditional model  










Sj 2 2 2 2 
Zjl 1(1), 5(4) 1(1), 5(4) 1(1), 5(4) 1(4), 3(4), 5(4), 10(4) 
cTot 17,552,758 17,578,374 24,207,733 3,626,415,156 
fRatio 2.96 2.96 2.83 1.02 
 
It is observed from Table 4.1 that optimal supply allocations of a congestion model 
increasingly differ from the traditional model as congestion severity grows.  For example, the 
allocated supplies of a traditional model and the congestion model are identical for all facilities 
under low levels of congestion, while they are different for two facilities, i.e., San Antonio, TX 
and Detroit, MA facilities under medium congestion level. Increasing congestion further (high 
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congestion level), it is observed that the allocations of a congestion model and the traditional 
models differ for every surviving facilities.  
 
Table 4.2, provides the optimal protection strategies (zjl), resulting attacks (sj), as well as 
total network costs (cTot) and maximum/minimum flow ratios (fRatio) obtained for this analysis 
under both traditional and congestion models. The flow ratio (fRatio) is a metric that is used to 
evaluate the balance of flows into facilities of the given network which affects the networks costs 
of congestion. A decreasing flow ratio with increasing congestion severity as demonstrated in 
this Table 4.2 indicate a more balanced flow allocations at higher congestion levels. As well, the 
optimal protection strategies under high congestion are observed to be different from traditional 
model while it is identical under low and medium levels of congestion. As balanced flow 
allocation ensure low costs of congestion, the protection design strategies that facilitate flow 
balance are generally preferable under high congestion severity. Therefore, designs which 
distribute available backup capacity in small units to many facilities, are desirable for flow 
balance and for minimizing the network congestion costs. 
 
 
4.3.2  Value of incorporating congestion  
 
In this section we investigate what compromise on the network costs will be made if the 
decision maker relies on conventional solutions and whether protection strategies and allocation 
decisions of a conventional model can be substituted for a model which considers congested 
network. The cost benefits signify the value of considering congestion in protection design 
models.  
 
Under the same levels of budget of protection (B=2680) and attacks (r=1) we compute 
the congestion value index (φ) which indicates the relative change in the total network costs 
when the flow allocations and protection strategy of a traditional model ignoring congestion is 




( ) ts cs cscTot cTot cTotϕ = −                                                                (4.26) 
 
The term 
cscTot   in the above expression represents the total costs (optimal objective 
function value) obtained from the model that considers congestion. The term 
tscTot   represents 
the total cost obtained when the protection strategy and allocations of a traditional model is 
substituted for the problem involving congestion.  In Table 4.3 we summarize the results for 
different congestion profiles. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Variations in total costs under congestion model and traditional model for 
varying congestion profiles 
Congestion profiles  cTotts cTotcs φ (%) 
w=0.1, q=1.1 17,578,374 17,578,374 0 
w=1, q=1.1 17,808,919 17,808,919 0 
w=10, q=1.1 20,114,369 20,114,369 0 
    
w=0.1, q=1.5 18,218,284 18,218,284 0 
w=1, q=1.5 24,208,019 24,207,733 0.002 
w=10, q=1.5 84,105,367 83,917,369 0.224 
    
w=0.1, q=2.0 57,452,123 57,051,093 0.703 
w=1, q=2.0 416,546,404 389,161,124 7.037 
w=10, q=2.0 4,007,489,218 3,626,415,156 10.508 
 
 
In this illustrative example, the given network may incur up to 10% less in total costs by 
considering congestion effects.  The higher the congestion severity, greater is the congestion 
value index. Therefore, when congestion associated costs are high, it may be cost effective to 
rely on protection designs and models that take congestion effects into account, whereas decision 
makers may rely on traditional models under low congestion severity.  
 
 




A trade-off among congestion costs, costs of transportation and cost of lost sales is 
involved when designing protection under congestion. As the choice of parameters w and q 
affect congestion costs, we analyze the cost trade-offs with respect to these parameter variations. 
The protection strategies and the resulting costs under varying values of congestion parameters 
(w=0.1, 1, 10 and q=1.1, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5) are summarized in Table 4.4. The operational costs and 
congestion cost variations under these congestion profiles are graphically demonstrated in Figure 
4.4a-f.  
 
Congestion cost trades off with transportation costs if the network incurs no lost sales. 
This is the case when attacks are low (i.e., r=1, r=2 in Table 4.4) and where capacity losses can 
be fully compensated, either from the slack system capacity or through the available backup 
protection. The transportation costs are more dominant than the congestion costs for smaller w 
and q, i.e., low congestion severity. Under low congestion severity, the optimal protection 
strategies and flow allocations of a congestion model may not differ from a traditional model and 
both models can result in same total transportation costs.  However, as can be observed in Table 
4.4, as congestion severity increases (increasing w and q), the flow allocations of a congestion 
model start to deviate from the traditional model. As congestion costs become more dominant, 
the model tries to balance flows in order to reduce this cost, which leads to a lower flow ratio 
than obtained in a traditional model. Since some demands are shifted to facilities other than their 
closest ones, the network cost of transportation increases.   
 
The congestion cost trade-off is with both the cost of lost sales and the transportation 
costs under increased attack levels.  As more capacities are lost under increased attacks, the 
surviving facilities tend to be fully utilized and cost of lost sales may be incurred due to unmet 
demands. Reductions of congestion costs through demand shifts or network flow balance are 
impossible under this scenario. Recovering lost capacities through a high volume backup 
protection, i.e., centralized protection, is not a preferred protection strategy of such networks due 
to the risks of increased congestion costs for its unbalanced flow distribution. A simultaneous 
reduction of congestion costs and the lost sales can be generally achieved through a decentralized 
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backup strategy. Such a strategy will yield low congestion costs for its more balanced flow 
distribution amongst the protected facilities.  
 
As demonstrated in Table 4.4, a tendency towards decentralizing protection is therefore 
observed under higher attack levels and a limited protection budget. However, under high 
congestion severity (high w and q), marginal increase in congestion costs for unit flow recovered 
are much higher than decrease of lost sales costs through recovery. Under this condition, the 
congestion model may prescribe a protection strategy where recovered capacity volumes are 
lower compared to a decentralized protection. Such a strategy obviously raises the cost of lost 
sales but it is the dominance of congestion costs which makes this strategy favorable over a 
decentralized protection strategy.  In the illustrative example, this scenario arises typically at 
congestion parameter settings of w=10 and q greater than or equal to 2. As demonstrated in 
Table 4.4, under w=10 and q=2.5 and r=3, the cost of lost sales of the selected strategy (zjl: 1(3), 
5(4), 6(4)) was about 40% higher than what can be achieved under a decentralized protection 
strategy (zjl: 1(4), 2(4), 3(4), 5(4)) at this attack level. Nevertheless, this strategy was still 

















r w q Sj Zjl cTot cFlow cLS cCong fRatio
1 0 - 2 1(1),5(4) 17,552,758 17,552,758 0 0 2.96
1 0.1 1.1 2 1(1),5(4) 17,578,374 17,552,758 0 25,616 2.96
1 0.1 1.5 2 1(1),5(4) 18,218,284 17,552,758 0 665,526 2.96
1 0.1 2 3 1(2),5(2) 57,051,093 17,797,897 0 39,253,196 2.53
1 0.1 2.5 2 1(4),3(4),5(4),10(4) 2,052,546,943 31,881,848 0 2,020,665,095 1.02
1 1 1.1 2 1(1),5(4) 17,808,919 17,552,758 0 256,161 2.96
1 1 1.5 2 1(1),5(4) 24,207,733 17,553,673 0 6,654,061 2.83
1 1 2 2 1(4),3(4),5(4),10(4) 389,161,124 27,192,724 0 361,968,400 1.26
1 1 2.5 2 1(4),3(4),5(4),10(4) 20,236,919,203 32,218,681 0 20,204,700,523 1.01
1 10 1.1 2 1(1),5(4) 20,114,369 17,552,758 0 2,561,611 2.96
1 10 1.5 2 1(1),5(4) 83,917,369 17,782,906 0 66,134,463 2.53
1 10 2 2 1(4),3(4),5(4),10(4) 3,626,415,156 31,882,196 0 3,594,532,960 1.02
1 10 2.5 2 1(4),3(4),5(4),10(4) 202,079,223,907 32,218,681 0 202,047,005,227 1.01
2 0 - 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 26,194,341 26,194,341 0 0 1.45
2 0.1 1.1 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 26,220,147 26,194,341 0 25,806 1.45
2 0.1 1.5 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 26,879,754 26,194,341 0 685,413 1.45
2 0.1 2 6,7 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 67,641,122 26,270,375 0 41,370,747 1.44
2 0.1 2.5 3,8 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 2,450,288,382 32,055,666 0 2,418,232,716 1.09
2 1 1.1 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 26,452,401 26,194,341 0 258,060 1.45
2 1 1.5 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 33,048,473 26,194,341 0 6,854,132 1.45
2 1 2 3,8 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 435,928,468 29,762,852 0 406,165,616 1.19
2 1 2.5 3,8 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 24,213,087,019 32,289,098 0 24,180,797,921 1.09
2 10 1.1 6,7 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 28,774,942 26,194,341 0 2,580,601 1.45
2 10 1.5 6,7 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 94,671,602 26,251,052 0 68,420,550 1.44
2 10 2 3,8 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 4,082,226,728 31,822,248 0 4,050,404,480 1.09
2 10 2.5 3,8 1(4),2(4),5(4),10(4) 241,840,268,307 32,289,098 0 241,807,979,209 1.09
3 0 - 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 33,395,008 25,969,408 7,425,600 0 1.22
3 0.1 1.1 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 33,419,578 25,969,408 7,425,600 24,570 1.22
3 0.1 1.5 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 34,064,760 25,969,408 7,425,600 669,752 1.22
3 0.1 2 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 75,225,321 25,969,408 7,425,600 41,830,313 1.22
3 0.1 2.5 3,8,10 1(3),5(4),6(4) 2,515,715,051 30,609,728 10,425,600 2,474,679,723 1.26
3 1 1.1 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 33,640,711 25,969,408 7,425,600 245,703 1.22
3 1 1.5 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 40,092,529 25,969,408 7,425,600 6,697,521 1.22
3 1 2 3,8,10 1(3),5(4),6(4) 440,407,860 30,609,728 10,425,600 399,372,532 1.26
3 1 2.5 3,8,10 1(3),5(4),6(4) 24,787,832,559 30,609,728 10,425,600 24,746,797,231 1.26
3 10 1.1 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 35,852,035 25,969,408 7,425,600 2,457,027 1.22
3 10 1.5 6,7,10 1(4),2(4),3(4),5(4) 100,370,218 25,969,408 7,425,600 66,975,210 1.22
3 10 2 3,8,10 1(3),5(4),6(4) 4,034,760,648 30,609,728 10,425,600 3,993,725,320 1.26
3 10 2.5 3,8,10 1(3),5(4),6(4) 247,509,007,637 30,609,728 10,425,600 247,467,972,309 1.26
min 17,552,758 17,552,758 0 0 1.01
avg 19,542,093,340 26,063,887 2,788,320 19,513,241,133 1.55





Figure 4.4:  Operational costs and Congestion costs under varying attack levels and 
congestion profile settings 
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4.3.4 Computational efficiency 
 
The computational efficiency of the algorithm is assessed under a larger network 
involving 50 demand nodes derived from the US Census Bureau dataset (see Appendix). Table 
4.5 summarizes the CPU times obtained under different parameter settings of attack levels (r), 
number of facilities (J), and the congestion profile parameters (w, q) under a finite budget level 
(B). These results demonstrate that under a finite budget of protection, the CPU times generally 
increase with both the increase in the number of attacks and the number of facilities. These 
results are consistent with the observations made in Chapter 3.  
 
We further observe that the computational efficiency is affected by incorporating 
congestion term in the protection design model. The linear approximations of convex non-linear 
congestion functions result in the addition of a set of constraints in the model. When the desired 
approximation error is low, interval granularity (K) is high i.e., the congestion cost function is 
approximated using an increased number of tangent hyperplanes. This has the effect of 
increasing problem size because of the new constraints that are added in the model. Table 4.6 
highlights the CPU time and the relative error of congestion approximation under different 
interval granularity (K) for different problem combinations and a finite budget of protection 
(B=2010 monetary units). It can be observed that as K increases, there is more accuracy in linear 










Table 4.5 CPU time variations under different parameter combinations 
r w q   CPU time (s)   j=5 j=10 j=15 
1 0.1 1.1  11 59 176 1 0.1 1.5  11 58 175 1 0.1 2  12 60 164 1 0.1 2.5  14 63 198        1 1 1.1  14 82 257 1 1 1.5  14 57 207 1 1 2  8 46 158 1 1 2.5  14 63 186        1 10 1.1  10 59 177 1 10 1.5  11 60 174 1 10 2  8 46 180 1 10 2.5  13 65 186        2 0.1 1.1  31 517 2544 2 0.1 1.5  28 542 2919 2 0.1 2  23 425 2170 2 0.1 2.5  32 586 2770        2 1 1.1  29 608 3685 2 1 1.5  27 516 2791 2 1 2  23 395 2332 2 1 2.5  32 637 2420        2 10 1.1  31 523 2550 2 10 1.5  33 529 2604 2 10 2  24 437 2285 2 10 2.5  37 551 2767        3 0.1 1.1  20 1953 19536 3 0.1 1.5  21 1953 24461 3 0.1 2  13 1394 14969 3 0.1 2.5  22 2169 18687        3 1 1.1  20 25 2752 3 1 1.5  21 2186 22126 3 1 2  13 1461 14679 3 1 2.5  24 2138 20917        3 10 1.1  20 2164 19342 3 10 1.5  21 2039 19628 3 10 2  13 1460 15185 3 10 2.5  22 2360 20791            Min   8 25 158 




Table 4.6 Congestion approximation errors and CPU times 
Instances 
(I_J_r) 
CPU time (s)   Congestion approximation error (%) 
K=25 K=50 K=75 K=100   K=25 K=50 K=75 K=100 
50_5_1 3 7 11 13  0.012 0.007 0.006 0.002 
50_5_2 8 18 27 37  0.008 0.007 0.003 0.001 
50_5_3 7 14 18 22  0.020 0.007 0.006 0.001 
50_10_1 16 36 48 65  0.148 0.039 0.017 0.009 
50_10_2 140 304 435 551  0.046 0.024 0.004 0.001 
50_10_3 535 1176 1686 2360  0.048 0.021 0.003 0.001 
50_15_1 41 96 150 186  0.241 0.059 0.027 0.016 
50_15_2 559 1273 1995 2767  0.205 0.055 0.023 0.013 
50_15_3 4262 9592 14593 20791   0.039 0.030 0.011 0.002 
 
As can be observed in the above results, the average computational time of the test 
instances on a 50 node network across all combinations was 6865 seconds. A maximum time of 
24461 seconds resulted under 3 facility attacks and 15 facilities. Although the CPU times are 
high, considering that the protection design problem presented here is a strategic decision 
problem the computational efforts of the proposed solution algorithm is acceptable. We remark 
that the need to incorporate more elements of resilient design in an already difficult nested 
optimization modeling framework, poses additional computational burden. In this analysis we 
limited the attacks to a few facilities considering that simultaneous attacks on many facilities is 
rare. Also we have limited the budget of protection which limits the depth of our search tree. 
Nevertheless, the proposed methodology has extended the scope of implicit enumeration 










4.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In this Chapter, we extended the responsive contingency planning model to incorporate 
congestion effects. The incorporation of congestion makes the model more robust to operate 
under realistic situations. A non-linear congestion cost function was developed to model 
congestion related costs due to increased flow volume on facilities. This convex non-linear 
function was then linearized applying piecewise linearization technique in which a set of tangent 
hyperplanes determined the linear congestion costs under varying flow levels at facilities. The 
incorporation of linear congestion cost function in the responsive contingency model enabled its 
formulation as a MILP. The tri-level responsive contingent planning model under congestion 
was then solved applying implicit enumeration technique. Computational efficiency of the 
algorithm was demonstrated using a 50 node (demand) network under varying number of 
facilities and attack levels. The impact of interval granularity (K) for linear approximation of the 
congestion cost function was analyzed as this significantly affected the computation time. It is 
demonstrated that as K increases, the relative errors of linear approximations are low but CPU 
time grows significantly.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that congestion affects design decisions of protection. We 
have demonstrated that the supply flow allocation which is more balanced is optimal under 
congestion effects as it lower over utilization of a single facility (and hence congestion).  This 
allocation requirement implies that traditional model solutions cannot be relied when congestion 
effects are significant. We demonstrate the value of congestion through empirical study 
comparing network total costs of a congestion incorporated model to a conventional (congestion 
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impacts ignored) model. It was observed that when supply network’s congestion associated costs 
are high, it is better to rely on protection designs and models that take this factor into account, 
even though one may substitute traditional solutions when congestion effects are low or 
negligible.  
 
The trade-off of congestion costs with the operational cost of transportation and lost sales 
were investigated and the optimal protection strategies under varying congestion severity were 
analyzed. The results demonstrate that decentralized protection is generally a preferred strategy 
under congestion conditions. However, when congestion severity is very high, the marginal 
increase of congestion cost for unit flow recovery through production backup is much higher 
than the decrease in the cost of lost sales. Under this condition it may be appropriate to centralize 








This dissertation proposes new mathematical models and appropriate mechanisms to 
address supply chain disruption risk mitigation and management problem. It focuses on 
enhancing supply chain responsiveness under disruption through contingency planning involving 
backup sourcing. In the first part of this dissertation, a game theoretic mathematical model is 
developed for generating contingency strategy involving appropriate volume and response 
speeds of a backup resource and protection of critical supply facilities. The major contribution of 
this model is in having a proper representation of the available backup resource capacity during 
disruption periods which enable more effective risk mitigation solutions. An illustrative example 
involving single facility attack is used to demonstrate that instantaneous production capacity 
assumptions lead to capacity overestimations and inappropriate mitigation solutions and 
inadequate recourse actions during major disruptions. Furthermore, through this example the 
demand routing characteristic optimal under a capacitated system is demonstrated. In particular, 
the importance of flow re-allocations rather than contingent re-routing in a capacitated network 
is established.  
 
The developed model is tested on two hypothetical networks with different initial capacity 
distributions to demonstrate that network topologies affect its vulnerability to disruptions and 
contingency strategies of protection can be different under varying network configurations. It is 
demonstrated that identical capacity distributions result in risk diversification effect, and are 
effective for controlling losses under a major disruptions. However, the relative efficiency 
improvements through protection are lower for such networks than networks with non-identical 
capacity distributions in its facilities. Through this analysis, it is observed that planning against a 
more capable adversary (higher number of attacks), necessitate the need to disperse or 
decentralize protection in order to spread out risk.  
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A solution methodology based on implicit enumeration algorithm utilizing the structure 
of the problem is developed in this part of the dissertation for solving the proposed model. The 
methodology extends the scope of implicit enumeration algorithm in handling multi-level of 
protections. The computational performance of the developed algorithm is assessed with respect 
to the variations in the budget of protection, number of attacks, number of facilities and number 
of demands. It is observed that computational time increase with the increase of budget level, 
attack levels, number of facilities or the number of demands. Raising the protection budget or the 
attack level lead to increase in the size of the search tree which affect the computational time. As 
well, increasing number of facilities and the number of demands both raise computation time but 
the effect of raising the number of facilities is higher than the effect of raising the number of 
demands. 
 
In the second part of the dissertation, we analyze the impact of congestion on responsive 
contingency planning against major disruptions. In many supply systems, congestion related 
costs are severe and disruptions tend to raise such costs. Congestion effects need to be 
considered during the planning stages. We therefore extend the responsive contingency planning 
model developed in the first part of the dissertation to incorporate congestion effects.   
Incorporation of congestion effects makes the proposed model even more robust to handling 
major disruptions. Through empirical study we demonstrate that congestion affects design 
decisions of protection. A significant savings in network costs can result by relying on models 
that explicitly incorporate congestion effects than the models that ignore congestion. A 
centralized protection which adds high volume back up capacity faster at higher response speeds 
is generally not desirable under congestion of the network, even though such protection plans 








5.2 Limitations and Future directions 
 
This dissertation leads to interesting future avenues which include the extension of the 
proposed model, improvements on solution methods and study of related problems. An obvious 
extension to the proposed model would be to relax some of the assumptions. For example, the 
considered problem assumes that facilities protected, i.e., where backup production is planned, 
never loses its base capacity. In practice, achieving facilities completely immune to disruptions is 
difficult. Relaxing this assumption will make our model more realistic. Further, focusing more 
on the recovery aspect or the contingent mechanism of protection, the model lumps the cost of 
protection into the cost of backup selection. Although this assumption is not restrictive, it may be 
possible to segregate budget into hardening or security of facilities and backup up production and 
let the model decide where to invest on security and where to invest on backup production. Few 
other model extensions can be:  a) integrating location decisions with protection decisions for 
design of new networks b) partial interdictions (i.e. attack not 100% successful) than complete 
interdiction c) probabilistic disruption considerations rather than deterministic 
 
In the solution methodology, the proposed approach has extended the scope of implicit 
enumeration approach in handling multiple levels of protection as earlier works considered 
protection at single level only. Although computation times grow, this approach can be utilized 
in solving larger problem instances since the responsive capacity planning problem dealt in this 
dissertation is of strategic nature. When decision makers are more risk averse, they tend to 
implement solutions that are robust under more severe attacks and larger network topologies 
involving larger protection budgets. Since the search tree grows with these considerations, it may 
be worthwhile to develop reduction rules to reduce the size of the search tree. The use of 
heuristic rules within the implicit enumeration scheme would reduce the computation time and 
therefore enhance the applicability of this methodology.  
 
A related future work to this dissertation can involve areas such as emergency relief, and 
crime protection, infectious disease spread-out protection, etc. In these areas, response and 
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recovery aspects are critical. The decisions may involve how to preposition shelters, inventories, 
etc or how to deploy security forces so that disruption responses are efficient.  The backup 
production volume and the response speed factors under these circumstances can be viewed as 
sets of activities each involving a response time, and therefore decisions would involve selection 
of appropriate activities and their proper speeds of response. The model developed in this 
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APPENDIX A: DISTANCE, DEMANDS AND FACILITY BASE CAPACITY DATA 
INPUTS  
A.1. Distance and demand quantities data inputs (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 ) 
City Demand









































 New York NY 8104 1 2458 718 1421 78 2142 2429 1372 1584 489 2554 647 2573 836 480 1513 956 171 740 191
 Los Angeles CA 3805 2458 1 1747 1381 2399 367 116 1250 1211 1985 294 1815 340 2154 1983 1235 1612 2324 1746 2601
 Chicago IL 2935 718 1747 1 939 667 1446 1726 800 1049 238 1836 164 1855 864 277 975 482 607 86 854
 Houston TX 2029 1421 1381 939 1 1345 1015 1300 225 189 1108 1605 868 1644 822 995 147 485 1253 1007 1607
 Philadelphia PA 1523 78 2399 667 1345 1 2079 2367 1300 1509 446 2501 585 2521 764 417 1438 882 93 697 268
 Phoenix AZ 1396 2142 367 1446 1015 2079 1 298 887 847 1683 609 1495 652 1792 1663 869 1262 1999 1457 2296
 San Diego CA 1260 2429 116 1726 1300 2367 298 1 1182 1125 1963 409 1783 456 2087 1951 1154 1559 2290 1730 2578
 Dallas TX 1234 1372 1250 800 225 1300 887 1182 1 253 998 1449 764 1485 906 913 181 420 1211 856 1550
 San Antonio TX 1189 1584 1211 1049 189 1509 847 1125 253 1 1238 1448 1000 1488 1011 1141 75 632 1418 1107 1767
 Detroit MI 960 489 1985 238 1108 446 1683 1963 998 1238 1 2069 240 2087 837 166 1164 626 401 252 617
 San Jose CA 922 2554 294 1836 1605 2501 609 409 1449 1448 2069 1 1926 47 2340 2090 1462 1775 2433 1821 2681
 Indianapolis IN 804 647 1815 164 868 585 1495 1783 764 1000 240 1926 1 1948 701 169 926 387 510 246 808
 San Francisco CA 800 2573 340 1855 1644 2521 652 456 1485 1488 2087 47 1948 1 2373 2112 1501 1805 2455 1838 2699
 Jacksonville FL 762 836 2154 864 822 764 1792 2087 906 1011 837 2340 701 2373 1 672 960 588 683 947 1019
 Columbus OH 715 480 1983 277 995 417 1663 1951 913 1141 166 2090 169 2112 672 1 1067 512 343 334 644
 Austin TX 682 1513 1235 975 147 1438 869 1154 181 75 1164 1462 926 1501 960 1067 1 559 1347 1034 1695
 Memphis TN 666 956 1612 482 485 882 1262 1559 420 632 626 1775 387 1805 588 512 559 1 792 561 1137
 Baltimore MD 664 171 2324 607 1253 93 1999 2290 1211 1418 401 2433 510 2455 683 343 1347 792 1 645 360
 Milwaukee WI 605 740 1746 86 1007 697 1457 1730 856 1107 252 1821 246 1838 947 334 1034 561 645 1 862
 Boston MA 598 191 2601 854 1607 268 2296 2578 1550 1767 617 2681 808 2699 1019 644 1695 1137 360 862 1
 El Paso TX 585 1899 712 1243 672 1831 348 629 569 500 1472 954 1259 995 1468 1423 526 973 1746 1271 2066
 Nashville TN 584 761 1786 395 667 687 1442 1739 615 824 473 1934 252 1962 501 335 752 196 597 481 944
 Denver CO 583 1626 843 910 876 1571 587 835 661 799 1146 933 993 956 1461 1158 768 876 1501 904 1762
 Seattle WA 578 2409 957 1734 1891 2375 1111 1060 1683 1786 1932 714 1870 681 2454 2010 1770 1869 2330 1686 2490
 Washington DC 578 204 2304 597 1221 127 1977 2269 1182 1387 399 2417 492 2439 649 328 1317 763 35 639 394
 Charlotte NC 560 533 2126 590 928 456 1779 2076 928 1105 512 2274 431 2301 341 352 1039 519 367 665 723
 Fort Worth TX 555 1403 1218 822 237 1330 854 1150 34 238 1024 1419 790 1455 938 941 171 451 1241 876 1580
 Portland OR 542 2444 822 1753 1834 2406 1002 928 1633 1717 1961 572 1882 538 2437 2029 1707 1850 2356 1712 2536
 Las Vegas NV 518 2236 232 1523 1231 2178 257 260 1076 1075 1760 375 1596 414 1972 1763 1088 1414 2105 1519 2376
 Tucson AZ 514 2120 455 1438 933 2054 116 367 824 759 1673 715 1474 759 1727 1641 787 1216 1973 1456 2280
 Oklahoma City OK 514 1328 1189 689 413 1260 840 1137 191 420 909 1357 689 1389 985 852 357 424 1176 732 1495
 New Orleans LA 489 1159 1686 824 328 1081 1320 1612 445 517 932 1893 705 1930 495 790 468 349 989 905 1349
 Cleveland OH 481 408 2054 311 1115 358 1744 2028 1024 1257 96 2146 263 2166 771 124 1183 631 307 340 552
 Long Beach CA 475 2454 27 1745 1364 2394 351 90 1236 1193 1982 320 1810 366 2141 1978 1218 1602 2319 1745 2599
 Albuquerque NM 455 1813 674 1123 752 1749 330 624 588 615 1359 862 1166 898 1485 1334 614 939 1670 1138 1969
 KS City MO 448 1096 1365 408 649 1035 1047 1333 455 705 640 1483 451 1508 950 619 636 374 960 438 1249
 Fresno CA 440 2460 201 1743 1487 2405 491 313 1333 1329 1977 120 1827 162 2227 1993 1343 1664 2336 1731 2592
 VA Beach VA 437 295 2375 715 1215 232 2037 2332 1206 1391 542 2504 588 2528 549 439 1325 790 180 768 471
 Atlanta GA 436 749 1941 587 701 671 1587 1884 717 881 601 2107 428 2137 287 438 817 333 579 671 939
 Sacramento CA 419 2505 353 1787 1604 2453 630 467 1439 1454 2018 91 1883 77 2321 2046 1463 1749 2388 1768 2628
 Mesa AZ 419 2128 387 1434 995 2064 21 316 868 827 1671 630 1481 673 1773 1649 849 1245 1985 1446 2283
 Oakland CA 411 2561 331 1844 1632 2509 641 447 1472 1476 2076 39 1936 13 2361 2100 1489 1792 2443 1827 2687
 Tulsa OK 399 1228 1277 593 441 1160 933 1229 236 485 810 1435 589 1466 916 752 416 340 1077 639 1395
 Omaha NE 394 1150 1317 433 796 1097 1029 1300 588 828 669 1405 528 1425 1101 689 764 536 1030 431 1286
 Minneapolis MN 392 1022 1527 354 1057 984 1274 1526 862 1109 539 1570 510 1584 1192 626 1042 703 938 295 1124
 Colorado Springs CO 379 1635 826 922 825 1577 549 809 614 742 1159 935 996 961 1436 1163 713 854 1505 922 1776
 Miami FL 375 1091 2345 1189 968 1027 1979 2267 1108 1149 1160 2557 1027 2593 327 996 1114 870 958 1273 1259
 Saint Louis MO 353 878 1593 260 680 813 1266 1557 546 792 456 1717 233 1742 754 399 717 245 734 328 1040
 Wichita KS 349 1267 1203 588 559 1204 875 1165 341 573 820 1341 620 1369 1031 788 511 445 1125 617 1424
 Santa Ana CA 348 2441 40 1732 1348 2381 335 78 1220 1177 1970 333 1797 379 2125 1965 1202 1587 2305 1733 2586
 
A.2. Facility base capacity in each time periods for 7 cities and 10 demand zone problem in 
Chapter 3 














Non-identical 8800 4500 3600 2700 2200 2100 2000







A.3. Facility base capacity in each time periods for 10 cities and 15 demand zones problem 
in Chapter 3 




















Non-identical 8600 4300 3500 2600 2100 1900 1800 1800 1700 1500
Identical 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980 2980
 
A.4.. Facility base capacity for larger networks involving 50,35, and 25 demand zones in 
Chapter 3 








































10 facility problem 10400 6100 5300 4400 3900 3700 3600 3600 3500 3300
15 facility problem 9400 5100 4200 3300 2800 2700 2600 2500 2500 2300 2200 2100 2100 2000 2000
20 facility problem 8900 4600 3800 2800 2300 2200 2100 2000 2000 1800 1700 1600 1600 1600 1500 1500 1500 1500 1400 1400
 
A.5. Facility base capacity (identical) each time period for 10 cities 15 demand zone 
problem in Chapter 4  




















Identical 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400
 
A.6. Facility base capacity for 50 demand zone problem in Chapter 4 
 






























5 facility problem 10950 10950 10950 10950 10950
10 facility problem 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475 5475
15 facility problem 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650 3650
